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THE RETROGRESSIVE FLAW OF CHAPTER 15
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: A LESSON
FROM MARITIME LAW
JOHN J. CHUNG*
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code became law in October
2005. It governs transnational bankruptcies and is designed to propel
bankruptcy law into the new age of global economic activity
conducted by multinational companies. According to Chapter 15’s
supporters, modern day corporations do business throughout the
world, and debtors and creditors need a structure that can provide
greater certainty and predictability in the event of bankruptcy by a
multinational debtor. At this time, the scope and contours of the new
law are still untested and unknown. Its first few years will likely
generate a struggle between those who have a more traditional view
of bankruptcy law and those whose goal is to internationalize it, with
the two sides seeking to narrow or expand the meaning and
application of Chapter 15. This struggle will be a continuation of the
debate between the two competing and polar models of transnational
bankruptcy law—territorialism and universalism.
Chapter 15’s proponents designed it with a view to promote
universalism. Universalism involves one court in one country taking
control of a multinational bankruptcy and applying its domestic
bankruptcy law to all of the debtor’s assets and creditors worldwide.
Universalism takes the view that in the event of bankruptcy by a
multinational debtor, the entire bankruptcy proceeding should be
governed by the court and bankruptcy law of the country that is the
“center of its [the debtor’s] main interests” (its home country, in
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other words). To illustrate, suppose a company owns and operates
factories in the United States and Germany, and has thousands of
creditors and employees in both countries. Suppose further that the
company was incorporated in Germany, has its headquarters in
Munich, owns and operates factories in Bavaria, and has half of its
employees and creditors in Germany. If this company filed for
bankruptcy protection, it is almost certain that Germany would be
deemed to be the center of its main interests. Consequently,
application of the pure universalist ideal would result in the German
court taking control of the case and applying German bankruptcy law
to the disposition of all of the assets and claims. Thus, unpaid
creditors in the United States would be required to seek repayment in
the German court, and their rights would be determined by German
bankruptcy law. This would be the situation even if the American
creditors had engaged in transactions exclusively within the
boundaries of the United States.
The beauty of this system, according to Chapter 15’s supporters,
is that all parties know in advance which law will apply in the event of
bankruptcy. Creditors will be able to enter into transactions with a
debtor and avoid the uncertainty of conflicting or inconsistent
bankruptcy laws in various countries. The supporters assert that the
new certainty will enhance global economic efficiencies and growth.
With such goals in mind, Chapter 15’s supporters applaud the
movement away from a traditional concept of bankruptcy law based
on territorial sovereignty, and urge the primacy of a global or
universal approach. The new law is viewed as proof that bankruptcy
law is finally catching up to the needs of modern business in an
increasingly globalized world, and that bankruptcy law will not be left
behind as international law gains prominence over national concerns.1
The supporters of Chapter 15 and universalism view these
developments as a tremendous advance in the area of international
bankruptcy law.
This Article takes a different view.
Namely, instead of
representing an advanced and cutting-edge model of international
law, universalism actually represents a tremendous step backward.
Universalism embodies a retrogressive approach to international law
that has been discredited by two centuries of U.S. Supreme Court
1. In 1996, the Second Circuit observed: “The management of transnational insolvencies
is concededly underdeveloped.” In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1047 (2d Cir.
1996). The question remains, however, whether the approach championed by the universalists
is the appropriate way to improve the situation.
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opinions concerning international commerce. In short, this Article
contends that universalism is based on a primitive state of
international law that ignores a long history of evolution and
refinement of international commercial law.
In order to consider, analyze, and understand this view, it is
necessary to focus on the essential structure of universalism. Under
universalism, a corporation takes the bankruptcy laws of its home
country into every country in which it does business. The bankruptcy
laws of its home country displace the bankruptcy laws of all other
countries. It carries the metaphorical flag of its home country into
every country it enters and the law of that flag governs the disposition
of all claims in the event of bankruptcy.
The metaphor of the flag is useful because it implicates
comparisons to what is perhaps the original and quintessential
international law—maritime law.
A fundamental principle of
maritime law is that a seagoing vessel is deemed to be part of the
territory of its home country, and displays its affiliation to its home
country by flying its flag. Broadly speaking, the flag has legal
significance because the law of that flag is the law of the vessel.
Throughout the history of the United States, foreign flag carriers
have repeatedly argued in U.S. courts that the law of their country is
the exclusive determinant of their rights and duties, even when they
enter U.S. territory, and that they are, therefore, exempt from U.S.
law. This view is basically the same as the view of the universalists—
the bankruptcy law of a corporation’s home country should govern
the treatment of all claims regardless of whether the corporation is
operating in a different country. However, the Supreme Court has
consistently rejected the arguments of foreign flag carriers, most
recently in Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., and applied a more
textured analysis that takes into account the factual setting and
related public policy concerns.
The outlook is uncertain, at best, as to whether Chapter 15 will
actually deliver its promised benefits. What is certain, however, is
that many domestic creditors will be materially harmed by the
application of a foreign bankruptcy law to their claims. Thus, issues
will arise as to whether such harmful results are unacceptable. In
other words, will there be instances where the application of a foreign
bankruptcy law violates a deeply-held public policy concern? Such a
concern will trigger and require consideration under the public policy
exception embedded in Chapter 15, which permits a court to refuse to
take any action if such action would be contrary to public policy. This
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statutory exception will play a crucial role in determining the shape of
the new law. This Article suggests that one useful tool to assist and
inform the analysis of these issues is the choice of law test developed
in the Supreme Court’s maritime cases, known as the LauritzenRomero-Rhoditis test. The Court employs this test to weigh choice of
law issues with public policy concerns (as opposed to the onedimensional and mechanical “law of the flag” test). The LauritzenRomero-Rhoditis test benefits from the fact that the courts have had
decades of experience in applying this test, and it seems that such
experience should serve as a guide to the development of Chapter 15.
As bankruptcy judges are called upon to define the scope and
contours of Chapter 15, it would seem advisable to look to the lessons
of maritime law.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of Chapter 15. Part II
then examines the theoretical roots of Chapter 15 through a
comparison of territorialism and universalism. Part III takes a sharp
turn away from the arguments in support of Chapter 15 by
highlighting, in a general way, the problems with Chapter 15 and
universalism. Part IV proceeds to draw the parallels between
universalism and maritime law, and presents the analytical foundation
to support comparisons between the two. Parts V and VI then
examine the Supreme Court’s line of relevant maritime cases and
explain what lessons they hold for transnational bankruptcy law. The
result is a proposed test, borrowed from Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis,
to assist the public policy and choice of law analyses. The Conclusion
compares the different processes through which Chapter 15 and the
maritime cases developed, and argues for reliance on the lessons from
maritime law.
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 152
Chapter 15 was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 20053 and became

2. This Part highlights a few of the main features of the new law, especially the features
that are necessary to understand in relation to the discussion of the maritime law issues. Parts I,
II, and III are derived Parts II through V of John J. Chung, The New Chapter 15 of the
Bankruptcy Code: A Step Toward Erosion of National Sovereignty, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 89,
92-110 (2006).
3. Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 801, 119 Stat. 23, 134-145 (2005) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-1532) (West
Supp. 2006) [hereinafter Act].
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effective on October 17, 2005.4 Chapter 15 is entitled “Ancillary and
5
Other Cross-Border Cases.” It applies to the bankruptcy of an
American multinational corporation or a foreign multinational
corporation with assets or operations in the United States.6 It
excludes from its application all natural persons who have debts
within the limits that determine eligibility for Chapter 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code (small debtors).7
Section 1501(a) enumerates five objectives: (1) cooperation
between U.S. courts and foreign courts; (2) “greater legal certainty
for trade and investment”; (3) “fair and efficient administration of
cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors,
and other interested entities, including the debtor”; (4) “protection
and maximization of the value of the debtor’s assets”; and (5)
“facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby
protecting investment and preserving employment.”8 Chapter 15
requires the American courts to “cooperate to the maximum extent
9
possible with a foreign court or a foreign representative.”
A Chapter 15 case is commenced by an application to the court
by a foreign representative for “recognition” of a foreign
10
proceeding. Chapter 15 mostly focuses on what is referred to as a

4. See id. § 1501.
5. The term “ancillary” generally refers to a limited proceeding that is designed to assist a
foreign proceeding. Evelyn H. Biery et al., A Look at Transnational Insolvencies and Chapter
15 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 47 B.C. L. REV.
23, 31. “Once an ancillary proceeding is invoked, the domestic court’s primary responsibility is
to aid the foreign court in administering the debtor’s assets.” Id. at 31-32. Parallel proceedings,
on the other hand, are full proceedings “in each country where the debtor has assets.” Id. at 32;
see also Jay L. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, the ALI
Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 10-12 (2002). The use of
the word “ancillary” in the title of Chapter 15 indicates that purpose of the legislation is to
promote “a general rule that countries other than the home country of the debtor, where a main
proceeding would be brought, should usually act through ancillary proceedings in aid of the
main proceedings, in preference to a system of full bankruptcies in each state where assets are
found.” H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 107-08 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 171.
6. Jay L. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 715 (2005).
7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1501(c)(2) (West Supp. 2006).
8. Id. § 1501(a).
9. Id. § 1525(a). “Perhaps the most innovative provision in the chapter is the
authorization for the courts, as well as a trustee or DIP [debtor in possession], to communicate
directly with the foreign court and trustee [pursuant to sections 1525 and 1526].” Westbrook,
Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 723.
10. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1504, 1515(a). “Foreign proceeding” and “foreign representative” are
defined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(23), (24) (2000).
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“foreign main proceeding.”11 A “foreign main proceeding” is “a
foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the
12
center of its main interests.” It is contemplated that a debtor’s
center of main interests will, in most instances, be its place of
13
incorporation, unless contrary proof is provided. The recognition of
a foreign main proceeding is a key event in a Chapter 15 bankruptcy
because it may conclusively decide the governing bankruptcy law. If
the debtor obtains recognition of a foreign main proceeding, then the
bankruptcy law of its home country will likely govern the entire case.14
The effect would be that the bankruptcy law of the debtor’s flag
would apply to all creditors and assets regardless of their location.
An order granting recognition of a foreign main proceeding also
triggers a wide range of powerful provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,
including the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 and the foreign
representative’s right to operate the American portion of the business
15
under 11 U.S.C. § 363. A court may dismiss or suspend a domestic
bankruptcy case if a foreign proceeding has been granted recognition
under Chapter 15 or the purposes of Chapter 15 “would be best
served by such dismissal or suspension.”16 In effect, the order
granting recognition converts these powerful provisions into tools to
enable the foreign representative to maintain and ensure the primacy
of the foreign proceeding.

11. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 717. Chapter 15 also governs a “foreign
nonmain proceeding,” see 11 U.S.C.A. § 1517(a)(1), which is defined as “a foreign proceeding,
other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a country where the debtor has an
establishment,” id. § 1502(5). As one would expect, the recognition of a foreign main
proceeding triggers more provisions than that of a foreign non-main proceeding. See id. § 1520.
12. Id. § 1502(4). As discussed later in this section, the phrase “center of its main interests”
is an example of the almost verbatim adoption of the language of the Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency promulgated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, because it is a phrase that is unfamiliar to American jurisprudence. See infra note 27.
13. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra note 5, at 14. Professor
Westbrook has likened the “center of its main interests” test to the more familiar “principal
place of business” test in the United States, and predicts that the Model Law language will be no
more difficult to apply than the familiar American test. Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to
Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2316 (2000).
14. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1504, 1515(a), 1520; see also Jay L. Westbrook, Universalism and Choice
of Law, 23 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 625, 630 (2005) (describing Chapter 15 as being designed to
apply the bankruptcy law of the center of the debtor’s main interests).
15. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1520.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (2000).
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Chapter 15 applies unless its application would violate public
17
policy. When the foreign representative applies for recognition, he
is not required to make a showing that public policy will not be
violated.18 It is up to an interested party or the court to raise the
issue. Thus, bankruptcy judges are at the front line of protecting
public policy interests, and may be the first line of defense for
creditors who are too small or disorganized to raise public policy
19
objections on their own.
The typical and non-controversial case for which Chapter 15 was
designed probably looks something like the following example: a
Canadian company with its headquarters in Toronto commences
bankruptcy proceedings in Canada. It has a widget-making factory in
Canada, and one in the United States. Each of the factories has
unpaid employees and suppliers. The American factory secures a
bank loan from an American lender, and the Canadian factory
secures a loan from a Canadian bank. The Canadian representative
applies for recognition of a foreign main proceeding under Chapter
15. The American court grants the application. All proceedings and
creditor actions in the United States are stayed, and the Canadian
representative takes control of all U.S. assets and operates the
American factory. The American creditors then pursue their claims
in the Canadian proceeding. The Canadian judge has jurisdiction
over all the assets and creditors, applies Canadian bankruptcy law to
the entire case, and resolves all claims together.
The Bankruptcy Code previously addressed international
bankruptcies in a single section, § 304, which was repealed and
replaced by Chapter 15.20 Section 304 permitted the filing of ancillary
cases in U.S. bankruptcy courts by foreign representatives “to protect
the dignity of concurrently existing foreign proceedings.”21 The

17. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (“Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take
an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public
policy of the United States.”).
18. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1515-1518.
19. In most large bankruptcy cases, there will be a multitude of unsecured creditors whose
individual claims are so small that it is not economically feasible to fully participate in the
proceedings. The unsecured creditors committee may advance such interests, but the
committee is comprised of large unsecured creditors, see 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1), whose interests
may or may not perfectly coincide with smaller creditors.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 304, repealed by § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat. 146; Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last,
supra note 6, at 714. In contrast to that single section, Chapter 15 contains five subchapters and
32 sections. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-1532.
21. Biery et al., supra note 5, at 33.
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purpose of the section was to prevent the “piecemeal distribution of
22
assets” in the United States by local creditors. While § 304 and
Chapter 15 may have similar goals, the language of § 304 was
primarily discretionary, as opposed to the mandatory language of
23
many of the provisions of Chapter 15. Section 304 did not require
the courts to grant any particular relief; it merely stated the court
“may” grant the relief enumerated in the section.24 This discretionary
language resulted in a wide variety of decisions under the old law—
25
some maintaining territoriality, and some embracing universalism.
According to Professor Westbrook, § 304’s language and prior case
law “apply only where they enable the court to go beyond Chapter 15
in cooperating with the foreign court,” but “[p]rior law does not apply
where it limits relief under Chapter 15.”26
As with the old § 304, the new Chapter 15 will likely generate
debate regarding the extent to which it promotes or achieves the

22. Id.
23. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1508, 517(a)-(c), 1525(a).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 304(a), repealed by § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat. 146. This is in contrast to the
language of Chapter 15 which states that “an order recognizing a foreign proceeding shall be
entered” and a “foreign proceeding shall be recognized” if certain conditions are met. 11
U.S.C.A. § 1517(a)-(b).
25. See generally Biery et al., supra note 5, at 41-48 (and cases discussed therein). There is
some debate as to whether § 304 embodied universalism.
Unable to win adoption of a universalist law or convention, the universalists asserted
that [§] 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which had been adopted in 1978, was such a
law. Section 304 authorized the bankruptcy courts of the United States to turn over
control of U.S. assets to foreign bankruptcy courts. But the statute added: “(C) In
determining whether to grant [such] relief . . . the court shall be guided by what will
best assure an economical and expeditious administration of such estate, consistent
with—(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the
order prescribed by [U.S. bankruptcy law].”
Read literally, [§] 304 clearly limits authority to surrender U.S. assets to situations in
which the foreign court will distribute them in substantially the same way a U.S. court
would. But the universalists, many of whom were themselves bankruptcy judges,
chose not to read [§] 304 as written. Instead, they claimed that [section] 304 authorized
turnover of assets to foreign courts that would distribute the assets substantially
differently, as long as the foreign country had a bankruptcy law “of the same sort
generally as [the United States].” Universalist judges, including Judge Burton R.
Lifland, began surrendering U.S. assets for distribution by foreign bankruptcy courts,
and universalist commentators, including Professor Jay L. Westbrook, cheered them
on. The effect was to sporadically implement universalism in the United States, at the
expense of the particular U.S. creditors whose assets were surrendered.
Lynn M. Lopucki, Global and Out of Control, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 84-85 (2005) (internal
citations omitted).
Professor Westbrook has characterized Section 304 as “modified
universalism.” See Jay L. Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2531, 2533 (1996). The Second Circuit viewed § 304 as “a step toward the universality
approach.” In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2001).
26. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 720.
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goals of universalism.27 The battleground for this debate will likely be
§ 1506, the public policy exception. Because many of the operative
provisions of Chapter 15 are mandatory, the primary means to avoid
their application will be to raise and prevail on the threshold issue of
28
whether the requested rulings violate public policy. The proponents
of universalism will argue that the public policy exception is designed
to be an extremely narrow exception to be applied in rare cases.
They need to advance this position because a broad application of §
1506 would frustrate the basic purpose of universalism. Those with
an opposing view will argue for a wide and liberal application of the
exception, to the point where it literally becomes the exception that
swallows the rule. 29 The potential importance of § 1506 makes the
comparisons to maritime law more compelling because the maritime
decisions have been driven by considerations of deep public policy
concerns.30

27. Its proponents will argue that the origins of the law make clear that universalism is the
goal. Chapter 15 explicitly incorporates the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the
“Model Law”), which was promulgated by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) based in Vienna. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1501(a); H.R. REP. NO. 10931(I) (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 105; Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note
6, at 719. The formal development of the Model Law began in the 1990s when the issue of
cooperation in international bankruptcies became the subject of a “working group” formed by
UNCITRAL. See Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 719. The efforts of this group
led to the promulgation of the Model Law at UNCITRAL’s Thirtieth Session on May 30, 1997.
Biery et al., supra note 5, at 49; Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra
note 5, at 3. In December of that year, the U.N. General Assembly approved the Model Law
through a resolution. Biery et al., supra note 5, at 49. The goal of the Model Law’s supporters
was clear: “The Model Law makes universalism the foundation of the United States’
international bankruptcy policy.” Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 143, 143 (2005). The lead American participant stated: “The number one reason for
adopting it was to demonstrate the United States commitment to the Model Law and to
cooperation and universalism generally, in the hope that our example would encourage other
countries to follow.” Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 726.
28. For this reason, § 1506 serves a vital systemic function. The need for discretionary
flexibility is present in any legal system, and students of legal theory would recognize the
applicability of Professor Hart’s observations to Chapter 15: “In every legal system a large and
important field is left open for the exercise of discretion by courts and other officials in
rendering initially vague standards determinate, in resolving the uncertainties of statutes, or in
developing and qualifying rules only broadly communicated by authoritative precedents.”
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 136 (2d ed. 1994).
29. It should be noted, however, that the legislative history of § 1506 discourages a broad
interpretation of the statute. It cautions that the public policy exception has been
narrowly interpreted on a consistent basis in courts around the world, and that the
word ”manifestly” in international usage restricts the exception to the most fundamental
policies of the United States. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 109.
30. See infra Parts V.A-C.
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II. THE THEORETICAL ROOTS OF CHAPTER 15
A. Territorialism and Universalism
In order to understand both the context out of which Chapter 15
arose and its potential consequences, it is necessary to understand the
two competing and opposite models of international bankruptcy
jurisdiction that define the debate: territorialism and universalism.
The debate over the two models gained increasing momentum during
the 1990s as international economic activity gained pace.
Territorialism is simply the traditional practice of nations
exercising exclusive jurisdiction over assets and parties within their
31
borders : “It is the default rule in every substantive area of law,
including . . . bankruptcy.”32 It rests upon traditional notions of
national sovereignty, which means that the law of the sovereign is
33
imposed on all people and property within its territorial reach. In a
transnational bankruptcy conducted under the principles of
territorialism, each country decides under its own laws how the
debtor’s assets within its territory will be treated in the face of
creditor claims, without deferring to any foreign proceeding involving
the same debtor.34

31. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2216, 2218 (2000); Frederick Tung, Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, 33
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 555, 561 (2001).
32. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, supra
note 31, at 2218. Territoriality is so embedded in the common understanding of law that its
daily manifestations probably escape attention. For example, no citizen of the United States
who stays within its borders has concerns whether a law passed by the British Parliament will
affect his or her rights. To be concerned would be silly because the laws of Great Britain have
no application in the United States. That is because, as a general matter, the power of British
laws is confined to the territory of the United Kingdom and British subjects. A shift in
sovereign power is most apparent to those whose daily lives involve the crossing of international
borders. For example, the many “frontaliers” who live in “France voisine” and work in the
Swiss cantons of Geneva and Vaud understand that the laws governing their activities change as
they cross the border. However, universalism would subject people to the laws of another
country even if they never venture outside their own borders.
33. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra note 5, at 5. To its
detractors, territorialism is referred to perjoratively as the “grab rule” because each nation’s
courts grab the assets within their jurisdiction for distribution under its own laws. Andrew T.
Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2179
(2000); See John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International
Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 944-45 (2005).
34. See LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, supra
note 31, at 2218; Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 31,
10 (2001).
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The following is a simple example of the historical application of
territorialism. Suppose a business has assets in both the United States
and the United Kingdom, and files a bankruptcy petition in the
United States. The laws of the United States will govern the
disposition of assets within its territory, but the assets in the United
Kingdom will not be affected by the filing. The creditors in the
United Kingdom may move to seize the assets there notwithstanding
the bankruptcy filing in America. In order to protect its assets in the
United Kingdom, the business will need to commence a separate
bankruptcy proceeding there that would proceed under United
Kingdom laws. Thus, there would be two separate and independent
proceedings, each applying its own nation’s law.
Universalism, on the other hand, is based on the concept of “one
35
law, one court.” It envisions a single bankruptcy proceeding in the
debtor’s “home country,” where a single court applies the bankruptcy
law of its country and makes “a unified worldwide distribution to
creditors through liquidation or reorganization.”36 That court would
have global jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s assets and creditors,
wherever located, and displace all the courts and laws of other
countries.37 Universalism requires a country to defer to a foreign legal
proceeding, even with respect to property within its own territory and
legal relationships formed and wholly conducted within its own
borders.38
By administering the case in one jurisdiction, universalism avoids
duplicative proceedings (and therefore duplicative administrative
costs). Its underlying theory posits that the overall value of the
bankrupt estate will be maximized because one forum will be able to
35. Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, supra note 34, at 40. One scholar
describes universalism in this way:
In its purest conceptual form, universalism aspires to the harmonization of one
worldwide, substantive law of bankruptcy. The most common model of universalism,
however, follows a pluralist route. Sidestepping the issue of which substantive
provisions the ideal bankruptcy law would possess, it simply selects from one of the
pre-existing bankruptcy regimes ex post. To the extent that other courts are needed
(to give legal force to the orders of the courts of the governing jurisdiction), such
courts could convene ancillary proceedings designed to effectuate the controlling
court’s orders. The current universalist paradigm thus concedes the divergence of
present domestic bankruptcy laws and advocates only a pluralist system of choice-oflaw; its theory does not envision (or rely upon) substantive harmonization of
those bankruptcy laws.
Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 948 (internal citations omitted).
36. Westbrook, Universalism and Choice of Law, supra note 14, at 625-26; Guzman, supra
note 33, at 2179.
37. Tung, Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, supra note 31, at 569.
38. Id.
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realize the sum of the parts or the going concern value, as opposed to
39
Plus, lenders’ costs will
a piecemeal liquidation or treatment.
theoretically be reduced because lenders will know in advance which
law will both govern repayment and apply to their collateral.40 Thus,
they are relieved of the burden of risk assessment in the face of
conflicting legal systems. Universalism’s benefits can be summed up
to include: (1) a more efficient allocation of capital; (2) a reduction in
confusion over competing domestic priority rules; (3) a reduction in
the lender’s cost of monitoring foreign assets; (4) a reduction in
administrative costs due to a reduction in the number of proceedings;
(5) an avoidance of forum shopping and the race to file; (6) facilitated
reorganizations; (7) an increased reorganization or liquidation value;
and (8) increased overall clarity and certainty to all parties.41 The
theory concludes that such reductions in costs and increases in
efficiency will lead to a reduction in the cost of lending and a
corresponding reduction in the cost of capital for borrowers.42
The ultimate benefits are described in the language of economics
and administration. What is missing, however, is the language that
describes the effects in human terms. The only identifiable people
who will allegedly benefit seem to be bankers and senior officers of
multinational borrowers. The problem is that Chapter 15 applies to
everyone in the United States, and it is (at best) uncertain how others
(such as small unsecured creditors, involuntary creditors, and
employees) would fare under the universalist approach.
Universalism is also supported by the need for “market
symmetry” (according to its proponents), which is “the requirement

39. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, supra note 13, at 2285. For
example, suppose a bankrupt company owns an American factory that produces widgets with
unique specifications for sale in the United States. It also owns a facility in Mexico that makes
slight modifications to the American widgets to comply with Mexican requirements. Suppose
further that the Mexican facility can only modify widgets with the particular specifications of its
sister American company. The universalists would correctly point out that the two facilities
should be sold or reorganized together because the Mexican facility’s value lies in its ability to
modify the American widgets. If sold separately, its value might be limited to the value of its
real estate and scrap value (with no value assigned to its modification process). Under
universalism, the two facilities would be administered together by a single court. Under a strict
territorial approach, the two might be administered completely separately by the two different
courts. The territorialists will point out, however, that territorialism allows for cooperation
between the courts to realize the highest value for the assets.
40. Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, supra note 25, at 2541.
41. Guzman, supra note 33, at 2179; Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at
947.
42. Guzman, supra note 33, at 2181.
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that some systems in a legal regime must be symmetrical with the
market, covering all or nearly all transactions and stakeholders in that
market with respect to the legal rights and duties embraced by those
systems.” 43 In order for bankruptcy law to be effective, it must cover
the entire market, and this need for market coverage explains why
bankruptcy law in the United States is federal (in other words, each
state does not have its own bankruptcy law) and specifically provided
44
for in the Constitution. Thus, the universalists extrapolate from this
national example to conclude that in a globalized marketplace,
bankruptcy law needs to be global.45
According to one of universalism’s supporters, “the majority
view, at least among academic circles, is that universalism is
normatively superior as an efficient and fair model to resolve crossborder defaults, notwithstanding the ongoing preference for
territorialism among many country’s [sic] policymakers.”46 With such
lofty notions to support their position, the supporters of universalism
belittle its detractors by arguing that the detractors are concerned
with what the supporters characterize as small and inconsequential
47
interests. One view seems to assert that universalists just know
better than others: “Despite the near-unanimous support of the
academic community, policymakers have chosen not to adopt
universalism. Although a number of other arguments have been
advanced for territorialism, its support leans heavily on a sense
among judges, legislators, and some academics that territorialism can
help small, local creditors.”48
Territorialism and universalism are at opposite ends of the
49
In the course of debate, the pure ideals of the two
spectrum.
competing models have been softened at the edges to widen their
appeal and to acknowledge actual practice (to some degree).50 The
modified versions are known as cooperative territorialism and

43. Westbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 13, at 2283.
44. See id. at 2286.
45. The theoretical support for the assertion that a bankruptcy law should have global
reach is questionable. See Chung, supra note 2, at 112-14.
46. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 951.
47. See Guzman, supra note 33, at 2193.
48. Id., at 2184. Small and inconsequential are in the eyes of the beholder, however.
49. There is also another model known as contractualism. It contemplates that a debtor
would contractually choose which country’s law to apply with each creditor. Biery et al., supra
note 5, at 30-31.
50. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 716; Pottow, Procedural
Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 952-57.
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modified universalism, which are closer together on the continuum.51
Cooperative territorialism permits a departure from strict territorial
sovereignty by encouraging cooperation on an as-needed basis, and
contemplates the use of international conventions to govern matters
such as the return of improperly removed assets on the eve of
bankruptcy.52 The typical scenario would involve each country in
which the debtor holds assets conducting parallel bankruptcy
proceedings and cooperating “through the interaction of agents
appointed by each state to represent the bankruptcy estate located
there.”53 Modified universalism departs from the pure universalist
ideal by accepting the right of a country to refuse (under certain
54
circumstances) deference to another country’s court. Chapter 15 in
its present form probably represents modified universalism.
B. Chapter 15 and the Promotion of Universalism
Pure universalism is the ultimate goal of many of those who
created the Model Law and promoted Chapter 15. However, there
were limits to how much they could accomplish. Given such limits,
even its supporters would probably concede that Chapter 15 does not
impose a pure universalist framework (at least not at this time). It
does not commit the United States to a global, substantive
bankruptcy law because there appears to be sufficient safety valves to
55
protect domestic interests. In some ways, it looks rather benign,
with its emphasis on cooperation and communication.56 Nevertheless,

51. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 716; Pottow, Procedural
Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 952-57.
52. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 954-55.
53. Tung, Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, supra note 31, at 562.
54. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 952. Professor Pottow observes:
“Taken to its extreme, then, the discretionary safety valve of modified universalism has the
potential simply to ‘modify’ universalism back into territorialism, because a state may refuse to
defer to the controlling state when its laws are different, i.e., when there is a true conflict of
laws.” Id. at 954.
55. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1506, 1521(b), 1522(a) (West Supp. 2006) (requiring the courts
to satisfy themselves that interests of creditors are protected before certain actions are taken).
56. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501(a), 1525, 1526, 1527. To the extent that Chapter 15
concerns itself with cooperation and communication, there is little reason to object to it. There
is agreement that cooperation is desirable. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in
International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999). With
respect to Chapter 15 in particular, there is merit to formalizing the ability of courts to
communicate with each other across borders, and to conferring official recognition on the
person who has authority over an insolvent estate. By having a formal structure in place, courts
are assured that they are acting within their authority by communicating with a foreign court
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Chapter 15 represents a significant step toward the ultimate goal of
universalism. This interpretation finds support in the scholarship of
universalism’s proponents. The proponents openly acknowledge that
it was too much of a challenge to move the United States and other
57
nations to full universalism. The delegates who agreed upon the
Model Law knew they had to operate within practical constraints.58
For example, the reason why a model law was generated (rather than
a treaty, for example) was because it would have been too difficult to
win acceptance of anything more substantial than a model law.59 This
also explains why the Model Law does not attempt to substantively
unify the different bankruptcy laws around the world; there never
would have been agreement.60
Appreciating the historical resistance to universalism, its
proponents set more modest goals for the Model Law. Thus, the
61
purpose of the Model Law is to advance universalism incrementally.
It advances universalism by gradually introducing the acceptance of
outcome differences in transnational insolvencies. As discussed by
Professor Pottow, outcome difference means the possibility that a
local creditor may end up worse off under the application of a foreign
bankruptcy law than under her domestic law.62 In other words, the
goal is to get creditors accustomed to the idea that the bankruptcy law
of another country may apply to them, and that they may end up
worse off under the foreign law. Professor Pottow thus describes the
Model Law as a device to acclimate creditors to the effects of
universalism:63 “In summary, while not overtly trumpeting its
universalist proclivities—and wisely so, given the consensus-dooming
touchiness of the ongoing debate—the Model Law actually contains
several provisions, albeit at the margin, which begin to ‘nudge’ states

and that they are dealing with authorized representatives. Plus, an established statutory
framework relieves the courts of the need to re-invent the wheel for each new case.
57. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 957-63.
58. Id.
59. See Jay L. Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563,
570 (1996); Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 958-9, 986.
60. Biery et al., supra note 5, at 50.
61. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 970; Westbrook, Creating
International Insolvency Law, supra note 59, at 571.
62. John A.E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems and
Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests,” 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1906 (2006).
63. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 988-90. The need for acclimation,
however, seems to be powerful proof that there is something to be wary of in the first place.
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along the way to ceding some sovereignty.”64 Thus, states come to
65
Universalism
accept some erosion of regulatory sovereignty.
66
remains, however, the “ultimate ideal.” On this same theme of
acclimation, Professor Pottow continued:
[T]here may be some states that let their guards down because of
the non-threatening nature of the universalist provisions in the
[Model] Law—states that may well be surprised to find themselves
moved slightly more along the universalist continuum and, upon
67
realizing that they are where they are, unlikely to move back.

One goal, then, is to ease the unsettling effects of transition. Such a
goal makes sense in that universalism seeks to alter centuries of
custom and expectations.
If there was any question as to whether adoption of the Model
Law was designed to commit the United States to a universalist
position, it was clarified by the promulgation of the Principles of
Cooperation in Transnational Insolvency Cases (the “Principles”)
among the Members of the North American Free Trade Association
(NAFTA), adopted by the American Law Institute in 2002 (the “ALI
68
Although the ALI Principles were developed for
Principles”).
NAFTA, they were also drafted with Chapter 15 in mind, and the
drafters were of the view that they should be applied generally to all
transnational bankruptcies (not just those involving NAFTA
countries).69
Professor Westbrook, a principal drafter of the
principles, described General Principle V of the Principles as urging
“that the courts of the NAFTA countries determine distributions
from a universalist perspective to the maximum extent permitted by
their respective laws.”70
Despite the clear aim of the Model Law, it apparently was
presented to Congress as a benign model of cooperation that was not

64. Id. at 983.
65. Id. at 976. It is interesting to note that universalism’s proponents have felt the need to
deny that the universalist aims of the Model were slipped past the Congress in disguise (denying
the contention that territorialist states were “hoodwinked” into adopting the Model Law). Id.
at 991.
66. Jay L. Westbrook, Fearful Future Far Off, 33 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS, Mar. 30, 1999, at
5 (“The Model Law did not make the terrible changes that [LoPucki] suggests. He would be
closer to right if the Model Law really did embody ‘universalism,’ which I regard as our ultimate
ideal.”).
67. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 991.
68. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control, supra note 25, at 87.
69. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 6, at 714.
70. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default, supra note 5, at 35.
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universalist.71 Only its supporters were permitted to testify before
72
The entire process was an exercise in universalism
Congress.
“through the back door.”73 Thus, there are two messages concerning
Chapter 15, and the content of each message depended on the
audience. For Congress, the message was: Chapter 15 is about
cooperation; there is no universalism in the legislation.
For
internationalists, on the other hand, the message was: Chapter 15 is a
74
significant step toward eventual and inevitable universalism.
C. The Fundamental Social Policies and Choices Embodied by
Bankruptcy Law
A reasonable question at this point is whether any harm (or
unacceptable harm) results from replacing one country’s bankruptcy
law with another country’s bankruptcy law through the operation of
Chapter 15 or the Model Law. To be sure, some creditors (and
mostly small ones at that) may become subject to a different payment
or priority structure, but such a result is negligible compared to the
global administrative or economic gains (according to the
universalists). If the harm is confined to small creditors, and limited
to whether a creditor receives a distribution of $5,000 or $7,500 (to
pick two arbitrary amounts), perhaps the tinkering with the
bankruptcy laws of various countries really does not matter when
compared to the benefits. Contrary to what may be popular belief,
however, bankruptcy law is not just about whether a creditor receives
fifty or seventy-five cents on the dollar owed.
Bankruptcy law embodies and reflects each society’s particular
choices concerning its attitudes toward money, debt, the relationship
between those with property and those without, employers and labor,

71. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 27, at 166, n.102 (2005) (citing Westbrook,
Fearful Future Far Off, supra note 66, at 5).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. It is also possible that universalism’s supporters will argue that Chapter 15 achieves the
goal of “one court, one law.” Now that Chapter 15 is law, they may argue that it fully embodies
universalism and will likely urge the courts to apply Chapter 15 as broadly as possible (to the
point, for example, where the public policy exception is rarely applied). This development
would be like a repeat of the universalists’ arguments after the enactment of § 304. See supra
note 24 (describing the arguments to have § 304 interpreted as universalism). This likely
scenario underscores the point that the enactment of Chapter 15 does not end the debate, but
rather gives it more urgency because substantive outcomes will depend on how much of the
universalist ideal will be read into it.
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and so on.75 In other words, bankruptcy law reflects and embodies
deep social issues that define the structure and aspirations of a
society. It does matter if one set of bankruptcy laws is replaced by
another. Each nation’s bankruptcy laws embody and reflect that
76
particular nation’s social and political choices. Bankruptcy laws are
the product of each country’s unique legal, historical, political, and
cultural context:77 “Given the vast cultural differences around the
world, and the history of each country’s economy and attitudes about
money and debt, there is no one-kind-fits-all bankruptcy system for
either enterprises or individuals.”78
In other words, bankruptcy laws reflect fundamentally different
views about each society’s aspirations. Thus, there are significant
consequences to substituting one nation’s bankruptcy law for another.
Whatever it may be, it is certainly not a like-for-like substitution. As
Professor Tung stated, “Bankruptcy law’s wholesale purview means
that recognition of a foreign proceeding effects the wholesale import
of another state’s regime for deciding sensitive policy issues. Political
judgments about local asset disposition and allocation of local losses
from the foreign firm’s demise are left in the hands of a foreign
court.”79
Even a strong supporter of Chapter 15 like Professor Pottow
recognized this problem, and his observation is equally valid: “When
one state cedes jurisdiction to another state to facilitate a marketwide resolution of the default, it must fully subjugate its broad-

75. Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 5
(2005).
76. Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, supra note 34, at 48. Bankruptcy laws
reflect a nation’s substantive policy decision and are distributive, “deciding which creditors
warrant special treatment in distribution” and which transfers of assets to specific creditors
should be set aside to further the greater good of all creditors. Pottow, Procedural
Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 941-42.
77. Martin, supra note 75, at 4 (presenting a wide-ranging survey and discussion of
historical and cultural influences in the development of bankruptcy laws in the United States
and various countries in Europe and Asia).
78. Id. at 5. On the subject of debt forgiveness, for example, which reflects fundamental
views of commercial and social obligations, “people are less forgiving about debt forgiveness
than they are in the U.S. In some parts of the world, not paying debts is the ultimate disgrace.
In other parts of the world, there simply is no personal bankruptcy system, and little in the way
of business reorganization either.” Id. at 35.
79. Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, supra note 34, at 52.
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reaching, deep-cutting, and policy-rich bankruptcy laws to those of
80
the controlling state.”
Moreover, there has been widespread recognition of the fact that
thorny questions lurk in the thickets of universalism and Chapter 15.
However, in their enthusiasm, the supporters have brushed aside
attempts to answer such questions. Professor LoPucki identified
several of the questions, which remain unanswered:
Under universalism, the court of the home country would have
jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case. But what would be included
in that jurisdiction? Could the court void an otherwise valid
collective bargaining agreement? Relieve the debtor of the
burdensome effects of environmental laws? Suspend the payment
of pensions to retired workers? Risk the pension fund in
81
a reorganization attempt?

The problem, of course, is that when such questions are finally
addressed, there will undoubtedly be a multitude of creditors who will
be rudely shocked by the answers and by the fact that such
unresolved questions were lurking in the first place.
Given the nature of bankruptcy law, the choice of law issue
encroaches upon and interferes with the basic framework of social
and legal values of a country. Thus, the concerns are not “just” about
bankruptcy law; the concerns are about a country’s social and legal
fabric. In light of these considerations, supporters of universalism
need to address questions of the following sort: Why should a
country’s deep social and legal values be subordinated to
universalism’s claimed benefits of administrative ease or economic
efficiency (assuming that such benefits exist in the first place)? How
does one go about weighing such social and legal values against
administrative ease or economic efficiency?
Who does the
weighing?82
Questions such as these and the nature of bankruptcy law
reinforce the importance of Chapter 15’s public policy exception.83
Issues involving labor rights, environmental protection, and
retirement security are just a few of the issues that will call for a judge

80. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 33, at 951.
81. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, supra
note 31, at 2237.
82. It seems fair to pose such questions to the universalists. After all, they are the ones
who seek a dramatic reform of the traditional system of territorialism. As a general matter,
those who seek to change the status quo should bear the burden of demonstrating that the
proposed change will be better than the current state.
83. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (West Supp. 2006).
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to decide whether American public policy would be violated. The
presence of such issues is precisely the reason why the exception
exists in the first place.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH CHAPTER 15 AND
UNIVERSALISM
The flaws in the theories supporting Chapter 15 and universalism
have been comprehensively discussed in the scholarship of Professors
84
The problems include: (1) the
Lynn LoPucki and Fred Tung.
adverse, prejudicial treatment of unsecured creditors, including
unpaid employees and tort creditors; (2) the incentives for improper
forum shopping and manipulation of venue; and (3) the general
absence of support for the assertion that economic benefits will be
realized.85 The numerous issues are beyond the purpose of this
Article, but one problematic scenario deserves further discussion
because it serves to highlight one intended result of Chapter 15 and
universalism, a result that the experience of maritime law has
deliberately sought to avoid.
The following hypothetical is based on Professor LoPucki’s
discussion of the results of a hypothetical bankruptcy involving the
automaker, Daimler-Chrysler.86 The hypothetical has been modified
to reflect a more current and possible development involving another
automaker and recent news events from Europe—the possible
bankruptcy of General Motors (GM) and labor unrest in France.87
General Motors is headquartered in Detroit.88 In Europe, it has
eleven production and assembly facilities located in eight countries
89
and employs around sixty thousand people. In France, it employs
around 1,798 people, including employees at a factory in Strasbourg.90
Suppose all the countries in the world succumbed to the universalists’
vision and adopted the Model Law. In the event of a bankruptcy
84. See supra notes 24, 26, 30-31, 34, 56.
85. See also Chung, supra note 2, at 110-28.
86. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control, supra note 25, at 93-94.
87. See generally Tom Petruno & John O’Dell, If GM Fails, Then What?, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
23, 2006, at C1; French Debate Resumes, As Do Protests, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE (Paris), Apr.
26, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/25/news/france.php.
88. See General Motors, Company Profile, http://www.gm.com/company/corp_info/
profiles/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
89. See General Motors Europe, GM in Your Country, http://www.gmeurope.com/country/
gm_in_your_country.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
90. General Motors Europe, GM in France, http://www.gmeurope.com/country/gm_
france.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
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filing by GM, a universalist would require administration of the case
in the United States, the home of GM. The likely result would be the
administration of the affairs of the French factory, including its
relationship with its employees and suppliers, in the United States
with the court applying American bankruptcy law to transactions
principally and, often times, exclusively among French parties.91 This
result would represent a complete disregard of the expectations and
practices of the French parties. Moreover, the parties would find
themselves in a distant court, represented by distant counsel, and
operating in a foreign language.
In this hypothetical bankruptcy, it is a near certainty that one of
the goals of a bankrupt GM would be to restructure its relationships
with and obligations to its employees.92 Given the legal, social, and
political climate in France when it comes to any issue that threatens
job security, there is no doubt that the French street and the French
government would oppose any efforts by GM to engage in AngloSaxon-style downsizing or restructuring.93 The situation would
undoubtedly create tension between the American and French
governments, and Americans would rightly question whether
America’s interests were at stake in an issue involving French jobs.
Yet, this is precisely the situation envisaged and welcomed by the
universalists. They would see value in purely French issues being
decided in an American court, even where America’s interest is
minimal. They would argue that any political tension within France
or between governments is a negligible price to pay in comparison to
the benefits of legal predictability, economic efficiency, and the

91. This result is consistent with the ALI Principles. See Westbrook, Multinational
Enterprises in General Default, supra note 5, at 38 (stating that subsidiaries should be allowed to
file for insolvency in the home country of the parent, and corporate groups should be
reorganized from a worldwide perspective like a single company).
92. This scenario is currently being played out in the bankruptcy case of Delphi
Corporation, an automotive parts supplier that was once owned by General Motors. Delphi is
seeking to reject the collective bargaining agreement with its employees. See Dina ElBoghdady,
Delphi to Present Case to Toss UAW Contract, WASH. POST, May 9, 2006, at D1.
93. French sensitivity to attempts to weaken or relax labor rights was vividly demonstrated
by the recent protests against a law designed to remove restrictions on terminating the
employment of workers under the age of twenty-six. The purpose of the law was to create more
flexibility in the youth labor market on the theory that employers would be more inclined to
hire young workers because the employers would not be committed to a more permanent
employment relationship. The law was opposed by more than one million street demonstrators,
with some of the demonstrators engaging in violence. The French government responded to the
protests by withdrawing the law. See France to Scrap Youth Jobs Law, CNN.COM, Apr. 10,
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/04/10/france.labor.law/index.html.
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demonstrated commitment to internationalize legal systems. One
court, one law—a model of simplicity and elegance, they would argue.
Fortunately for those with a more realistic and clear-eyed view of
international commerce and relations, there is an alternative model of
law that actually exists and has been time-tested—maritime law. The
types of international issues that the UNCITRAL Working Group
tried to address through abstract debate have been the subjects of
centuries of maritime trade. Cases and controversies generated by
the friction of actual practice and commerce have led to welldeveloped law governing and guiding parties who transact outside
their borders. Instead of re-inventing the wheel at United Nationssponsored discussions, actual solutions forged through centuries of
experience may already exist in maritime law.
IV. PARALLELS BETWEEN
CHAPTER 15 AND MARITIME LAW
A bedrock principle of universalism is the notion that a foreign
corporation brings with it all of its domestic bankruptcy laws in the
94
event of bankruptcy. Thus, if a German company doing business in
the United States seeks bankruptcy protection, universalists would
argue that the bankruptcy laws of Germany should govern the
treatment of all of its American creditors and assets. It is as if the
German company flies the German flag wherever it goes, with
German law therefore applying to all who do business with it. This
concept behind universalism looks much like a primitive form of the
law of the flag era in maritime law. It is unknown whether the
UNCITRAL working group had in mind such maritime law principles
as they developed the Model Law, or whether the working group
members were aware of any possible parallels. Nonetheless, the
concepts are remarkably similar, or at least similar enough to inquire
whether maritime law can perhaps add to or guide the development
and application of Chapter 15.95
Maritime law refers to “the entire body of law, rules, legal
concepts and processes that relate to the use of marine resources,

94. See supra Part I.
95. A connection between international bankruptcy theory and maritime law was
tangentially alluded to in Westbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 13, at 2316, by a reference
to flags of convenience in a discussion concerning forum shopping by debtors, and this
connection was also touched upon in Chung, supra note 2, at 123 n.148.
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ocean commerce, and navigation.”96 Maritime law arose out of the
practical needs of the first merchants who set sail from their shores to
97
engage in commerce. Given its origins and purpose, maritime law is
inherently international in nature.98 At their roots, maritime law and

96. 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 2 (4th ed. 2004).
Although commonly used as synonyms, admiralty law is distinct from maritime law in that
admiralty law is about the law of ships and shipping. Id. at 1. This article refers to maritime law
because of its wider scope.
97. See id. at 2. A nineteenth-century American scholar described maritime law’s
relationship to commerce in the following manner:
Commerce naturally and necessarily followed upon navigation. To regulate the
multiform transactions of the former, and to encourage the latter, soon required the
attention of the early commercial States. Maritime laws were adopted, appropriate to
the limited wants of an infant trade, but containing nevertheless the elements of the
expanded system, that now comprehends the commerce of the world, and prescribes
the rule of decision, in all contested cases arising out of it.
HENRY FLANDERS, A TREATISE ON MARITIME LAW 3 (1852). Professors Gilmore and Black
wrote, “Maritime law was secreted in the interstices of business practice. It arose and exists to
deal with problems that call for legal solution, arising out of the conduct of the sea transport
industry.” GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 11 (2d ed.
1975).
98. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 96, at 2 (“Although its rules are a part of the internal
legal order of each country and, consequently, important national differences persist, the
essential concepts and institutions of maritime law are remarkably similar all over the world.”).
Indeed, maritime law is one of the earliest forms of international law and may be the
quintessential international law. Early forms of maritime law are found in the Code of
Hammurabi from around 1800 B.C. Id. at 3 (provisions relating to marine collisions and ship
leasing). The Phoenicians, and later the island of Rhodes, dominated maritime activity and law,
and Rhodes is reputed to have developed the Rhodian Sea Code around 900 B.C. (although
there is considerable dispute as to whether Rhodes did in fact develop such a code). Id. at 4; 1
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 1-5 to -13 (7th ed. 2006). The imperial Romans adopted and further
developed the maritime law of the ancient Greeks, and this law became part of the Jus Gentium,
the law governing all within the Roman empire. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 96, at 4-7.
Following the fall of the empire, the Italian city-states (starting around the year A.D. 1000)
dominated maritime activity in the Mediterranean and further developed the Roman maritime
law. Id. at 7; GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 97, at 4. In the latter part of the thirteenth
century, trade between Aquitaine, England, and Flanders resulted in the Rolls of Oleron, the
most important and influential of the medieval sea codes, which was derived from Roman and
Italian sources. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 96, at 9. The Rolls became the basis of the common
maritime law of the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean, and also served as the chief early authority
for the English Admiralty. Id. at 9-10. The Maritime Court in Barcelona produced the Libro
del Consulat del Mar, which was first printed in 1494, and the court provided the model for the
Admiralty of England. Id. at 11; BENEDICT, supra at 1-27. After independence, America’s own
maritime laws were influenced (but not restricted) by England’s experience, and America
“received” the traditional body of maritime law (subject, of course, to its particular needs and
circumstances). SCHOENBAUM, supra note 96, at 16-18; BENEDICT, supra, at 7-5 to -9;
GUSTAVUS H. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 7-13
(1939). This quick and truncated summary of the lineage of maritime law may interest those
who enjoy history, but its main purpose is to demonstrate that maritime law has developed over
a period of time measured in millennia and reflects the practices and legal conclusions of widely
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the concepts underlying Chapter 15 are concerned with a common
subject—the promotion and regulation of international commerce.
Under American law, maritime law is “a body of uniform federal
law drawing its authority from the Constitution and laws of the
99
United States.” Article III of the Constitution provides that the
judicial power of the United States shall extend “to all cases of
100
28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”
that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil case
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.101 The federal nature of
102
maritime law is an accepted part of admiralty jurisprudence.
Some of the foundational issues in the development of maritime
law were the questions of: (1) Which law applies to a seagoing
vessel?; (2) Which law governs the rights of crew members (including
matters of working conditions, health and safety)?; (3) Which law
regulates the construction and structure of a vessel to ensure
seaworthiness?; and (4) Which law applies to the commission of a tort
103
Civilized nations agreed that vessels
or crime aboard a vessel?
104
could not be laws unto themselves. A law had to govern, but which

disparate regions, cultures, and eras. Unlike Chapter 15, maritime law did not spring forth fullyformed from a working group, like Athena from the brow of Zeus. One historian observed:
If we trace [maritime] law to its source, we shall find that it is not the growth of a single
generation, nor the product of a single mind, but the accumulated wisdom of
progressive ages, and different nations. It is founded on the practices of merchants,
the principles of Civil Law, approved compilations of maritime rights and usages, such
as the Laws of Oleron and Wisbury, the writings of eminent jurisconsults, and the
adjudications of the Admiralty Courts of different countries.
FLANDERS, supra note 97, at 1. For this reason, it would seem helpful for any contemporary
development involving international commercial law to seek at least some guidance from
maritime principles.
99. Romero v. Int’l Term. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 377 n.49 (1959) (citing The Lottawanna, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1875)).
100. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000).
102. Romero, 358 U.S. at 378. However, maritime law is not “a mystic over-law to which
even the United States must bow. When a case is said to be governed by foreign law or by
general maritime law that is only a short way of saying that for this purpose the sovereign power
takes up a rule suggested from without and makes it part of its own rules.” The Western Maid,
257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922).
103. See FLANDERS, supra note 97, at 38, n.1.
104. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 96, at 49-50. Ships must have a nationality: “Ships
without nationality may be boarded by any state, even on the high seas, and any state may assert
jurisdiction over a stateless vessel.” Id. Moreover, the “flag state is obligated to prescribe and
enforce laws to protect the passengers and crew aboard a ship flying its flag and to ensure that
good order is maintained.” Id. Thus, the requirement that a ship sail under a particular flag is
the legal framework that ensures that a ship will be governed by law, and not be a law unto
itself.
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one? The response to this question gave rise to the principle of the
105
“law of the flag.” In its simplest form, the law of the flag has been
described as the notion that seagoing vessels are like floating bits of
territory of the sovereign whose flag it flies, with the law of that
106
sovereign governing the vessel and those on board. The Supreme
Court described the principle in the following way:
Perhaps the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law
relevant to our problem is that which gives cardinal importance to
the law of the flag. Each state under international law may
determine for itself the conditions on which it will grant its
nationality to a merchant ship, thereby accepting responsibility for
it and acquiring authority over it. Nationality is evidenced to the
world by the ship’s papers and its flag. The United States has
firmly and successfully maintained that the regularity and validity
of a registration can be questioned only by the registering state.
This Court has said that the law of the flag supersedes the
territorial principle, even for purposes of criminal jurisdiction of
personnel of a merchant ship, because it “is deemed to be a part of
the territory of that sovereignty [whose flag it flies], and not to lose
that character when in navigable waters within the territorial limits
107
of another sovereignty.”

Although the concept may be oversimplified and general, the notion
that a ship is governed by the law of its flag retains vitality and
usefulness, and still serves as a starting point for modern cases
involving conflicts between the laws of one nation and the laws of a
ship’s flag nation.
One of the Supreme Court’s earliest rulings involving the law of
108
the flag was issued in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. That
case arose out of the disputed ownership of a vessel that was
109
anchored in Philadelphia. Two “libellants” filed their action against
the vessel, which they referred to as the Schooner Exchange, and
alleged that they were its sole owners.110 According to their
complaint, the vessel was on a voyage to Spain when it was forcibly
taken by persons acting under the orders of Napoleon, and converted

105. See Patterson v. Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 176 (1903) (“A ship which bears a nation’s flag is
to be treated as a part of the territory of that nation. A ship is a kind of floating island.”
(quoting Queen v. Anderson, 1 L.R.C.C. 161)).
106. See id.
107. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-85 (1953) (footnotes omitted).
108. 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
109. Id. at 117.
110. Id.

01__CHUNG.DOC

278

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

10/4/2007 9:50:53 AM

[Vol 17:253

into a French vessel.111 The vessel was later sailed into the port of
112
The French government denied
Philadelphia by the new captain.
that the vessel had ever belonged to the libellants.113 Thus, the
underlying facts of the history of ownership were disputed.
Nonetheless, it appears there were several undisputed facts that
were important to the decision. A vessel called the Balaou sailed into
Philadelphia flying the French flag.114 It was a public, armed vessel of
France (a warship, in other words) at the time it was in
Philadelphia.115 The Balaou’s presence in U.S. waters was lawful, and
116
the United States did not object to its presence.
Chief Justice Marshall framed the issue as whether “an
American citizen can assert, in an American court, a title to an armed
117
national vessel, found within the waters of the United States.” The
Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the libel action, and held
that the courts had no jurisdiction to decide a title dispute involving
the warship of a foreign sovereign.118 With the benefit of hindsight,
The Schooner Exchange looks like an easy case. If any vessel is to be
considered a floating piece of its country’s territory, it would certainly
be a warship in service of its sovereign. Imagine America’s response
if any other country claimed that its laws governed the aircraft carrier,
the USS John F. Kennedy. Just mentioning the hypothetical exposes
its absurdity.
The Schooner Exchange and the above-quoted language from
119
Lauritzen could, one imagines, support a colorable argument that
the law of the flag is or should be the exclusive determinant of the law
applicable to a vessel. However, a fair reading of the Supreme
Court’s maritime cases suggests that The Schooner Exchange may
have represented the high water mark for the sanctity of the law of
the flag. Since 1812, the Court has repeatedly rejected attempts to
argue that the flag of a foreign vessel exempts it from the application
of U.S. law.120

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 118.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 147.
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-85 (1953).
See infra Part V.
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Yet, the proponents of universalism and Chapter 15 seem to urge
the primacy of the law of the flag for transnational bankruptcies, and
it does appear that the law of the flag provides some support for the
concept that one law (the law of the home country) should apply to
the bankruptcy of a company. However, the Supreme Court’s history
demonstrates that the concept of the law of the flag is nowhere near
as broad or generous as a reading limited to a few sources might
suggest. Indeed, if one accepts the legitimacy of the parallels between
international bankruptcy theory and maritime law, the maritime cases
actually raise serious questions and expose serious flaws in the
underlying foundations of universalism.
V. LESSONS FROM MARITIME LAW
The metaphor of seagoing vessels as little pieces of their
sovereign’s territory, carrying the law of their sovereign on their
voyages, is routinely acknowledged in court opinions, but the
opinions also immediately distance themselves from that metaphor by
describing it as a discredited or “mischievous fiction.”121 Indeed, the
history of the law of the flag in America can be described as
beginning with the simple notion that the law of the flag governs a
vessel, with almost each subsequent case exposing the unworkable
simplicity of that concept and then limiting its meaning and
application. The following discussion will begin with a review of
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.,122 the most recent, relevant
Supreme Court case, and then it will jump back in time to the early

121. The commonly accepted understanding of the “law of the flag” principle was described
as follows:
In support of their contention the defendants refer to the statement sometimes made
that a merchant ship is a part of the territory of the country whose flag she flies. But
this, as has been aptly observed, is a figure of speech, a metaphor. The jurisdiction
which it is intended to describe arises out of the nationality of the ship, as established
by her domicile, registry and use of the flag, and partakes more of the characteristics of
personal than of territorial sovereignty. It is chiefly applicable to ships on the high
seas, where there is no territorial sovereign; and as respects ships in foreign territorial
waters it has little application beyond what is affirmatively or tacitly permitted by the
local sovereign.
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923) (citations omitted). The Court’s decisions
have made clear, however, that there are limits to the principle’s usefulness:
Some authorities reject, as a rather mischievous fiction, the doctrine that a ship is
constructively a floating part of the flag-state, but apply the law of the flag on the
pragmatic basis that there must be some law on shipboard, that it cannot change at
every change of waters, and no experience shows a better rule than that of the state
that owns her.
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 585 (footnote omitted).
122. 545 U.S. 119 (2005).
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maritime cases and move forward chronologically to show the
development of the Court’s jurisprudence over the decades.
A. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.
123

In Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., the Supreme Court
addressed the issue whether Title III of the Americans with
124
Disabilities Act (ADA) applied to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S.
waters.
The petitioners were disabled individuals and their
companions who purchased tickets in 1998 or 1999 for round-trip
cruises on two ships that departed from Houston.125 The ships were
operated by Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., a Bermuda corporation
126
with its principal place of business in the United States. The ships
127
at issue flew the flag of the Bahamas.

123. Id. at 125.
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). In a nutshell, Title III of the ADA prohibits
discrimination against the disabled in the full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations, §
12182(a), and public transportation services, §12184(a). The general prohibitions are
supplemented by various, more specific requirements.
Entities that provide public
accommodations or public transportation: (1) may not impose “eligibility criteria that . . . tend
to screen out” disabled individuals, §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), 12184(b)(1); (2) must “make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are
necessary” to provide disabled individuals full and equal enjoyment, §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii),
12184(b)(2)(A); (3) must provide “auxiliary aids and services” to disabled individuals, §§
12182(b)(2)(A)(iii), 12184(b)(2)(B); and (4) must remove architectural and structural barriers,
or if barrier removal is “not readily achievable,” must ensure equal access for the disabled
“through alternative methods,” §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v), 12184(b)(2)(C). These specific
requirements, in turn, are subject to important exceptions and limitations. Eligibility criteria
that screen out disabled individuals are permitted when “necessary for the provision” of the
services or facilities being offered. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), 12184(b)(1). Policies, practices, and
procedures need not be modified, and auxiliary aids need not be provided, if doing so would
“fundamentally alter” the services or accommodations being offered. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)(iii). Auxiliary aids are also unnecessary when they would “result in an undue burden.” §
12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). The barrier removal and alternative access requirements do not apply
when these requirements are not “readily achievable.” §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v). Additionally,
Title III does not impose nondiscrimination or accommodation requirements if, as a result,
disabled individuals would pose “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot
be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of
auxiliary aids or services.” § 12182(b)(3).
125. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126.
126. Id.
127. Id. It is a common and widespread practice of owners of vessels to operate their vessels
under the flags of countries to which the operators or vessels have little, if any, substantive
connection. As early as 1953, the Supreme Court noted that “it is common knowledge that in
recent years a practice has grown, particularly among American shipowners, to avoid stringent
shipping laws by seeking foreign registration eagerly offered by some countries.” Lauritzen, 345
U.S. at 587. This practice enables shipowners to register their vessels in countries with favorable
or lax regulations under so-called flags of convenience, in order to escape the burdens of their
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The petitioners were plaintiffs in a class action filed in the U.S.
128
District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Their complaint
allege[d that] the respondent charged disabled passengers higher
fares and required disabled passengers to pay special surcharges;
maintained evacuation programs and equipment in locations not
accessible to disabled individuals; required disabled individuals, but
not other passengers, to waive any potential medical liability and to
travel with a companion; and reserved the right to remove from the
ship any disabled individual whose presence endangered the
129
“comfort” of other passengers.

They also “allege[d] more generally that the respondent ‘failed to
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, and procedures’
necessary to ensure the petitioners’ full enjoyment of the services
130
respondent offered.” They further alleged that “most of the cabins
on the respondent’s cruise ships, including the most attractive cabins
in the most desirable locations, [were] not accessible to disabled
passengers,” and “allege[d] that the ships’ coamings—the raised

home countries. See generally Tony Alderton & Nik Winchester, Regulation, Representation
and the Flag Market, J. FOR MAR. RES., Sept. 2002, available at http://www.jmr.nmm.ac.uk/
server/show/conJmrArticle.53. In the fifty-plus years since Lauritzen, the practice has grown
more widespread, and is certainly not limited to American shipowners. The development of this
practice was described by Professor Jonathan Gutoff in his amicus brief in support of the
petitioners in Spector. Brief for Jonathan Gutoff as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, 545 U.S. 119 (2005) (No. 03-1388) [hereinafter Gutoff
Brief]. Gutoff states:
Following the Second World War, United States vessel owners became aware of the
great cost savings of Panamanian registry as it freed them from United States shipping
regulations. Similarly, with encouragement from the State Department the Liberian
registry was created by American oil companies for their tankers both as a means of
avoiding United States regulations and a tool for foreign aid. . . .
In the 1980s a large number of other nations started opening up their registries to the
owners of vessels from around the world. Since then the number of open registries and
vessels flying those registries flags has continued to grow. The nations providing open
registries gain income from the registration fees and any taxes they may impose. The
vessel owners gain freedom from regulation and, very often, taxes from the countries
in which they are located or where they base their operations. Vessel owners shop
around for registries that will provide them with the best possible conditions in terms
of fees, regulation and access to various markets, and registries compete with each
other for the business of vessel owners. Indeed there is a commercial website on which
subscribers can, with the click of a mouse, comparison shop among various ship
registries to find the registry best suited, in terms of cost and regulatory environment,
for a vessel owner.
Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted). Indeed, the practice is so widespread that by 1998, 51.3 percent of
the world’s total gross tonnage was registered under flags of convenience. See Alderton &
Winchester, supra, at 2.
128. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126.
129. Id. at 133-34 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 134.
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edges around their doors [made] many areas of the ships inaccessible
131
to mobility-impaired passengers who use wheelchairs or scooters.”
In response to a motion to dismiss the claims, the district court
ruled that Title III generally applied to the cruise ships and allowed
the claims to proceed, except for the claim based on the physical
132
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part
barriers, which was dismissed.
and reversed in part. It held that “general statutes do not apply to
foreign-flag vessels in United States territory absent a clear statement
of congressional intent.”133 Because “Title III does not contain a
specific provision mandating its application to foreign-flag vessels, the
Court of Appeals sustained the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s dismissal of the
petitioners’ barrier-removal claims . . . and reversed [the rulings] on
the remaining Title III claims.” In other words, the cruise line won at
this appellate level.134
135
The Court’s
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit.
decision was noteworthy, in one respect, because of the splintered
nature of its ruling. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the
Court, but his opinion is the opinion of the Court only with respect to
136
Parts I, II.A.1 and II.B.2, which were joined by four other Justices.
The other parts of his opinion were not supported by a majority.137
The line-up of the votes might seem to suggest wide disagreement,
and perhaps confusion, over the applicability of the ADA to foreign
flag carriers. Remarkably, however, the Court was quite clear on the
fundamental, first principle. Six Justices explicitly and flatly rejected
the argument that foreign flag carriers are beyond the reach of the
ADA.138

131. Id.
132. Id. at 127 (majority opinion).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 127-28.
135. See id. at 125.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Justice Scalia dissented from the holding, which was joined by two other Justices.
Id. at 149 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined in part of the dissent. Id. However, he
did not join in Justice Scalia’s broad view that the ADA does not apply. In his own, separate
opinion, Justice Thomas wrote: “Title III applies to foreign ships only to the extent to which it
does not bear on their internal affairs. I therefore would remand for consideration of those
Title III claims that do not pertain to the structure of the ship.” Id. at 149 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas thus shared the views of Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer that the ADA does apply (at least to some extent) to foreign flag carriers.
See id.
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion noted the strong policies underlying
the ADA, and explored the conflict between its policies and the
asserted protection of the law of the foreign flag carrier:
Cruise ships flying foreign flags of convenience offer public
accommodations and transportation services to over 7 million
United States residents annually, departing from and returning to
ports located in the United States. Large numbers of disabled
individuals, many of whom have mobility impairments that make
other kinds of vacation travel difficult, take advantage of these
cruises or would like to do so. To hold there is no Title III
protection for disabled persons who seek to use the amenities of
foreign cruise ships would be a harsh and unexpected interpretation
of a statute designed to provide broad protection for the disabled.
§12101. The clear statement rule adopted by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, moreover, would imply that other general
federal statutes—including, for example, Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. §2000a et seq.—would not apply
aboard foreign cruise ships in United States waters. A clear
statement rule with this sweeping application is unlikely to reflect
139
congressional intent.

There may be a variety of interpretations supported by the Court’s
various opinions. However, one point is clear: There are limits to the
“law of the flag.” Any force that the doctrine may have must give
way to more compelling policy considerations. Given the important
policies and aims of the ADA, it is not surprising that the Court
rejected the notion that a foreign flag is a shield against the ADA’s
requirements. It is also clear that a majority of the Court was not
prepared to permit entire sectors and swathes of the U.S. population
to be removed from the protection of U.S. laws by a choice of flag.
Imagine if the Court had accepted the Fifth Circuit’s view of the
law. A disabled U.S. citizen watches a commercial for a fun-filled
cruise on her local Houston television channel. She sees an ad for the
same cruise in her local newspaper. Inspired by the promises of the
cruise ship operator, she purchases a ticket at her local travel agent.
She boards the ship in Houston, and the ship returns her to Houston.
The vast majority of the other passengers are also Americans.
Instead of the vacation of a lifetime, however, the cruise turns out to
be an ordeal in which her experience is qualitatively inferior and
deficient due to the restrictions placed on disabled passengers. It
turns out that many of the promises contained in the advertising do
not apply to disabled passengers. She complains to the cruise ship

139. Id. at 132 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
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operator, but the operator points out that he or she has no legal
obligation to address or remedy the passenger’s complaints because
the ship is registered under the flag of Mongolia, which has no law
comparable to the ADA. The unhappy passenger files suit in federal
court, where the district judge dismisses the case and apologetically
explains that Mongolian law controlled all of her rights and remedies
when she boarded that ship.140
Given the alternative scenario to the holding in Spector, it is
difficult to imagine that the case could have turned out any other
way.141 Moreover, the holding in Spector is consistent with the

140. Land-locked Mongolia does, in fact, have a ship registry, with a growing number of
registrations. Gutoff Brief, supra note 127, at 5. This hypothetical assumes, but does not
represent, that Mongolia lacks an equivalent of the ADA.
141. Notwithstanding the seeming inevitability of the ruling, the cruise line had weighty and
substantive arguments in its favor. It pointed out that ships sail from country to country, and
that it would be impractical, indeed impossible, for a ship to comply with conflicting standards
and regulatory schemes. To illustrate, one country might require fixed handrails to be one
hundred centimeters above the floor of the deck, while another might require a height of 120
centimeters. One country might require coamings to be on a certain deck or section of the ship,
while another might not. Different regulatory schemes might mandate different requirements
for the height of a coaming above the floor of the deck. A ship obviously cannot be structurally
or architecturally altered from port to port. This reality probably explains why the Spector
opinions were as splintered as they were. The Justices took different views as to just how much
the ADA requires in terms of affecting the operation of a vessel. See, e.g., Spector, 545 U.S. at
158 (Scalia, J., dissenting). There was disagreement over what modifications were “readily
achievable,” and they noted that some modifications might pose “a significant risk to the health
or safety of others,” a significant concern when regulating seagoing vessels. See id. at 158.
There was also concern that the ADA’s requirements would require a ship owner to violate the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47,
1184 U.N.T.S. 2, which is a treaty concerning the safety standards governing the design and
maintenance of oceangoing ships. For example, the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG)
Review Advisory Committee—the government body charged with formulating the Title III
barrier-removal guidelines—promulgated rules requiring at least one accessible means of egress
to be an elevator, whereas SOLAS, which requires at least two means of escape, does not allow
elevators to be one of them. In theory, a vessel could comply with both sets of requirements by
having an elevator as well as two other means of egress. However, this problem of overlapping
requirements was the burden that the cruise line sought to avoid, in addition to the greater
potential problem that different regulatory requirements would be conflicting as well as
overlapping. These issues exposed what was probably the fundamental source of disagreement
among the Justices. As framed by Justice Scalia in his dissent, “The plurality correctly
recognizes that Congress must clearly express its intent to apply its laws to foreign-flag ships
when those laws interfere with the ship’s internal order.” Spector, 545 U.S. at 149 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In other words, the divisive issue was the extent to which the ADA intruded upon a
vessel’s “internal order.” Justice Kennedy expressly acknowledged and addressed the issue by
stating:
Our cases hold that a clear statement of congressional intent is necessary before a
general statutory requirement can interfere with matters that concern a foreign-flag
vessel’s internal affairs and operations, as contrasted with statutory requirements that
concern the security and well-being of United States citizens or territory. While the
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Supreme Court’s long line of maritime cases decided over the past
two centuries. If the Court had reached the opposite holding, it
would have represented a drastic departure from the Court’s
maritime jurisprudence.
B. Nineteenth-Century Cases
142
Brown v. Duchesne was an early case, which at first glance
seemed to be about the primacy of the law of the flag. However, like
The Schooner Exchange, the case speaks more to the limits of that
concept. The petitioner, Brown, was the owner of the U.S. patent for
a certain type of improvement in the construction of the gaff for
sailing vessels.143 Brown brought a patent infringement action against
the defendant because the improvement was used in the construction
of the defendant’s vessel (which was harbored in Boston) without
Brown’s permission.144 The defendant was a citizen of France, who
was the master of a French schooner.145 The vessel had been built in
146
The improvement at
France and was owned by French citizens.
issue was placed on the vessel in France, and the defendant argued
that the improvement had been in common use in French merchant
vessels “long before the plaintiff obtained his patent.”147 The Court
framed the issue in the following manner:

[W]hether any improvement in the construction or equipment of a
foreign vessel, for which a patent has been obtained in the United
States, can be used by such vessel within the jurisdiction of the
United States, while she is temporarily there for the purposes of
148
commerce, without the consent of the patentee?

The Court ruled in favor of the defendant, stating:
[T]he rights of property and exclusive use granted to a patentee
does not extend to a foreign vessel lawfully entering one of our

clear statement rule could limit Title III’s application to foreign-flag cruise ships in
some instances, when it requires removal of physical barriers, it would appear the rule
is inapplicable to many other duties Title III might impose.
Id. at 125 (majority opinion). Despite the difficulties raised by these issues, the important point
remains that a majority of the Court rejected the argument that the law of the flag is the starting
and ending point of the analysis. See id. at 132 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
142. 60 U.S. 183 (1856).
143. Id. at 193. A “gaff” is a “spar used in ships to extend the heads of fore-and-aft sails
which are not set on stays.” VI THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 307 (2d ed. 1989).
144. Brown, 60 U.S. at 193.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 193-94.
148. Id. at 194.
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ports; and . . . that the use of such improvement, in the
construction, fitting out, or equipment of such vessel, while she is
coming into or going out of a port of the United States, is not an
infringement of the rights of an American patentee, provided it was
placed upon her in a foreign port, and authorized by the laws of the
149
country to which she belongs.

In reaching this holding, the Court noted that the grant of a
patent is domestic in character and confined within the limits of the
150
United States. It also observed that the “only advantage which the
defendant derived from the use of this improvement was on the high
seas, and in other places out of the jurisdiction of the United
States.”151 Further, the Court noted:
But, so far as the mere use is concerned, the vessel could hardly be
said to use it while she was at anchor in the port, or lay at the wharf.
It was certainly of no value to her while she was in the harbor; and
the only use made of it, which can be supposed to interfere with the
rights of the plaintiff, was in navigating the vessel into and out of
the harbor, when she arrived or was about to depart, and while she
152
was within the jurisdiction of the United States.

By one interpretation, this case can be read to uphold the law of
the flag. However, the case is actually more about the territorial
limits of patent law. More importantly, the Court’s decision was
based on the fact there was little harm in refusing to apply U.S. patent
protection to the French vessel because there was no material
commercial impact on or involvement with the United States.153 It
seems fair to conclude that the patent holder would have prevailed if
he had been able to show a material commercial impact in the United
States. Thus, Brown actually argues against the universalists’
assertion that foreign law should govern the bankruptcy of a foreign
multinational business. Such a bankruptcy would certainly have a
material commercial effect on the local market.
The limits of the law of the flag doctrine were more explicitly
addressed in a later case, Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail of
154
Hudson County, commonly known as Wildenhus’s Case. In October
1886, a Belgian steamship was moored at the dock in Jersey City,

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 198-99.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id.
120 U.S. 1 (1887).
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New Jersey.155 Joseph Wildenhus, a Belgian citizen and member of
the crew, stabbed and killed another crew member who was also a
156
The murder occurred below the deck of the
Belgian citizen.
steamship, out of the sight and awareness of anyone on land.157 There
were several eyewitnesses of the crime, all of whom were also
158
crewmembers. The Jersey City police arrested Wildenhus, charged
him with a crime under New Jersey law, and held him in the Hudson
159
County jail. The Belgian consul applied for a writ of habeas corpus,
seeking the release of Wildenhus so that he could be subjected to
Belgian law.160
In deciding the case, the Court considered the meaning of a
treaty between the United States and Belgium under which each
nation “granted to the other such local jurisdiction within its own
dominion as may be necessary to maintain order on board a merchant
vessel, but has reserved to itself the right to interfere if the disorder
on board is of a nature to disturb the public tranquillity.”161 Thus, the
issue before the Court turned on whether the homicide was a
disturbance of the public peace or “public repose” of the people of
New Jersey.162 The Court observed that certain kinds of conduct on
board a vessel would not rise to the level of a disturbance of the
public peace because the local residents would not be affected by it.163
It then went on to describe the kind of conduct that would impact the
local community:
Not so, however, with crimes which from their gravity awaken a
public interest as soon as they become known, and especially those
of a character which every civilized nation considers itself bound to
provide a severe punishment for when committed within its own
jurisdiction. . . . The principle which governs the whole matter is
this: Disorders which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on
board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the
home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be
suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper
authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times
to determine to which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
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disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending
circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that
felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction; and that, if
the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in a regular
way, the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it. That,
164
according to the petition for the habeas corpus, is this case.

Thus, the Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s refusal to deliver
Wildenhus to the Belgian consul. This was the decision despite the
165
fact that the crime was between Belgians on a Belgian flag carrier.
The Court rejected the notion that all acts on board the ship were
under the exclusive jurisdiction of Belgium and that the ship
constituted Belgian territory for purposes of criminal jurisdiction.166
This case, like Brown, reinforces the principle that the effect on
the local setting must be taken into account when considering any
167
deference to the law of the foreign flag. Indeed, these cases suggest
that impact on the local setting is the dispositive factor in the analysis.
In other words, the law of the flag retains vitality up to a point.
However, the law of a foreign flag must yield to local law when the
impact on local concerns reaches a certain point.
C. Twentieth-Century Cases
In the first years of the twentieth century, the Court considered
168
the case of Patterson v. Eudora, which involved the application of a
statute that prohibited the payment of wages in advance to sailors.169
By its terms, the statute expressly applied to foreign vessels, in
170
addition to American vessels. The petitioners were sailors on board

164. Id. at 17-18.
165. See id. at 19.
166. See id.
167. See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1856).
168. 190 U.S. 169 (1903).
169. The statute was called, “An act to amend the laws relating to American seamen, for the
protection of such seamen, and to promote commerce.” Id. The statute was designed to
prevent certain unscrupulous practices used to staff ship crews:
The story of the wrongs done to sailors in the larger ports, not merely of this nation,
but of the world, is an oft-told tale, and many have been the efforts to protect them
against such wrongs. One of the most common means of doing these wrongs is the
advancement of wages. Bad men lure them into haunts of vice, advance a little money
to continue their dissipation, and, having thus acquired a partial control and by liquor
dulled their faculties, place them on board the vessel just ready to sail and most ready
to return the advances. When once on shipboard and the ship at sea the sailor is
powerless and no relief is availing. It was in order to stop this evil, to protect the
sailor, and not to restrict him of his liberty, that this statute was passed.
Id. at 175.
170. Id. at 171.
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the Eudora, who filed a libel for wages in district court.171 The sailors
boarded the Eudora in January 1900 in Portland, Maine for a voyage
172
to Brazil with a return to the United States or Canada. Wages were
arranged as follows: “At the time of shipment twenty dollars was paid
on account of each of them and with their consent to the shipping
agent through whom they were employed.”173 After completion of
their voyage, the sailors demanded wages for the full term of their
service notwithstanding the advance payments to the shipping
agent.174 The defendant understandably objected to payment, and
argued that the American statute at issue did not apply to the
175
The defendant argued that the contract
Eudora, a foreign vessel.
with the sailors was a contract to be performed on a British vessel,
which was British territory, and that British law should apply to the
sailors’ claims.176 In other words, the defendant argued that the law of
the flag should apply. The Court ruled against the defendant and in
favor of the sailors, stating, “no one within the jurisdiction of the
United States can escape liability for a violation of those provisions
on the plea that he is a foreign citizen or an officer of a foreign
merchant vessel.”177
The nation’s attempt at prohibition generated another important
case regarding the law of the flag. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon involved
several steamship companies seeking an injunction against
application of the National Prohibition Act, which went into effect in
December 1919.178 In October 1922, the Attorney General issued an
opinion “to the effect that the National Prohibition Act, construed in
connection with the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
made it unlawful (a) for any ship, whether domestic or foreign, to
bring into territorial waters of the United States, or to carry while
within such waters, intoxicating liquors intended for beverage
purposes, whether as sea stores or cargo, and (b) for any domestic
ship even when without those waters to carry such liquors for such
purposes either as cargo or sea stores.”179 After being advised that the

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 178.
262 U.S. 100, 119 (1923).
Id. at 120.
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government would seize their liquor, the plaintiffs sought their
180
Several of the steamship companies were foreign
injunctions.
companies and operated their vessels under foreign flags.181
The foreign flag carriers predictably raised the argument that the
prohibition laws did not apply to them because of the law of the flag,
182
and the government argued against that position. The Court said,
“Of course, if it were true that a ship is a part of the territory of the
country whose flag she carries, the [government’s] contention would
fail. But, as that is a fiction, we think the [government’s] contention is
183
right.” Thus, Cunard represented another decision by the Supreme
Court limiting the scope of the law of the flag, and upholding the
application of domestic law to foreign flag carriers (especially
184
domestic law advancing strong policy interests).
Viewed in this
way, Cunard foreshadowed the Court’s ruling in Spector, and both
can be read as rejections of attempts to circumvent or undermine
domestic policy by seeking application of a contrary foreign law.
The Jones Act later generated an additional set of law of the flag
cases. Uravic v. F. Jarka Co. arose out of the death of an employee
185
Anton Uravic, an American
stevedoring in New York harbor.
citizen, was employed to stevedore by the F. Jarka Co., a Delaware

180. Id. at 120-21.
181. Id. at 119.
182. Id. at 123-24.
183. Id. at 124.
184. Although it was famously abandoned, Prohibition embodied strong public policy
concerns and goals when it was enacted:
The Eighteenth Amendment meant a great revolution in the policy of this country, and
presumably and obviously meant to upset a good many things on as well as off the
statute book. It did not confine itself in any meticulous way to the use of intoxicants in
this country. It forbade export for beverage purposes elsewhere. True this
discouraged production here, but that was forbidden already, and the provision
applied to liquors already lawfully made. It is obvious that those whose wishes and
opinions were embodied in the amendment meant to stop the whole business. They
did not want intoxicating liquor in the United States and reasonably may have thought
that if they let it in some of it was likely to stay. When, therefore, the amendment
forbids, not only importation into and exportation from the United States, but
transportation within it, the natural meaning of the words expresses an altogether
probable intent. The Prohibition Act only fortifies in this respect the interpretation of
the amendment itself. The manufacture, possession, sale and transportation of spirits
and wine for other than beverage purposes are provided for in the act, but there is no
provision for transshipment or carriage across the country from without.
Id. at 130-31 (quoting Grogan v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 259 U.S. 80, 89 (1922)) (citation
omitted). Whether or not Prohibition was ill-advised is immaterial to this analysis. The crucial
point is that the Court refused to allow strong public policy goals to be undermined by the
application of a law of a foreign flag.
185. 282 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1931). “Stevedore” means “[t]o load or unload cargo of (a ship).”
XVI THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 661 (2d ed. 1989).
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corporation.186 In July 1926, Mr. Uravic was on a vessel flying the
187
German flag, helping to unload it. He suffered an injury while on
188
board, and died as a result. The issue before the Court was whether
the Jones Act applied to his death.189 The issue was important
because application of the Jones Act barred certain defenses of the
190
employer regarding its liability for the death.
The defendant urged the Court to view Mr. Uravic in the same
manner as a hypothetical German seaman who might have suffered
191
fatal injuries on board the German ship. Under such circumstances,
the Jones Act would not apply, and the defendant argued the same
192
result should govern the suit arising out of Mr. Uravic’s death. In
short, the defendant argued that the Jones Act should not apply to an
American employed to stevedore who suffered fatal injuries while on
board a German ship, and that the law of the flag (German law)
should apply instead.193
The Court rejected the argument that an American employed to
stevedore should lose the protection of American law because of the
happenstance that he was injured while on board a German vessel.194
In the decision, Justice Holmes flatly dismissed the possibility that
German law might control,195 and stated, “There is strong reason for
giving the same protection to the person of those who work in our
harbors when they are working upon a German ship that they would

186. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 237-38.
187. Id. at 238.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 237. The Jones Act governs (among other things) the liability of vessel operators
and marine employers for the work-related injury or death of an employee seaman. 46 U.S.C. §
688(a) (2000) provides:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at
his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and
in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law
right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in
case of the death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal
representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or
regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be
applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which
the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
§ 688(a).
190. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 238.
191. See id. at 240.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 239.
195. Id. at 240.
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receive when working upon an American ship in the next
196
dock . . . .” He went on to say:
It always is the law of the United States that governs within the
jurisdiction of the United States, even when for some special
occasion this country adopts a foreign law as its own. There hardly
seems to be a reason why it should adopt a different rule for people
subject to its authority because they are upon a private vessel
197
registered abroad.

Another important case in this area was Hellenic Lines Ltd. v.
198
Rhoditis, which also involved the application of the Jones Act. The
respondent, Rhoditis, was a Greek seaman on board the Hellenic
Hero, a vessel registered under the Greek flag and operated by the
199
petitioner, a Greek corporation.
Rhoditis’s employment contract
provided that Greek law governed, and required all claims arising out
of the contract to be adjudicated in a Greek court.200 Rhoditis was
injured while the Hellenic Hero was docked in New Orleans, and
201
sought compensation under the Jones Act in U.S. district court.
The district court found in his favor, and the decision was affirmed by
202
The petitioner appealed, arguing that the Jones
the circuit court.
Act did not apply to a situation that was so dominated by its
connection to Greece and Greek law.203
While acknowledging the strong connections to Greece,204 the
Court noted the following connections to the United States.
Although the petitioner was a Greek company, its largest office was
in New York and it also had an office in New Orleans.205 More than
ninety-five percent of its stock was owned by a Greek citizen who
206
lived in Connecticut, and had lived in the United States since 1945.
Additionally, the Hellenic Hero was “engaged in regularly scheduled
runs between various ports of the United States and the Middle East,

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 238.
Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
398 U.S. 306, 307 (1970).
Id. at 307-08.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 307-08.
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Pakistan, and India,” and “its entire income [was] from cargo either
207
originating or terminating in the United States.”
After weighing the various connections to Greece and the
United States, the Court held that U.S. law applied to Rhoditis’s
claim, stating:
We see no reason whatsoever to give the Jones Act a strained
construction so that this alien owner, engaged in an extensive
business operation in this country, may have an advantage over
citizens engaged in the same business by allowing him to escape the
obligations and responsibility of a Jones Act “employer.” The flag,
the nationality of the seaman, the fact that his employment contract
was Greek, and that he might be compensated there are in the
totality of the circumstances of this case minor weights in the scales
compared with the substantial and continuing contacts that this
alien owner has with this country. If, as stated in Bartholomew v.
Universe Tankships Inc., 263 F.2d 437, the liberal purposes of the
Jones Act are to be effectuated, the facade of the operation must
be considered as minor, compared with the real nature of the
operation and a cold objective look at the actual operational
contacts that this ship and this owner have with the United States.
By that test the Court of Appeals was clearly right in holding that
petitioner Hellenic Lines was an “employer” under the Jones
208
Act.

If nothing else, Rhoditis demonstrates that the Court refuses to
engage in mechanical or bright-line tests based on such simple
measures as the law of the flag in determining the applicability of
American law to foreign flag carriers. The Court could have limited
its analysis to asking which flag flew over the Hellenic Hero. Instead,
the Court chose to engage in a more textured, and difficult, analysis
to resolve the issue.
D. Summary
This line of cases shows that the Supreme Court has consistently
and repeatedly rejected the argument that the law of a foreign flag
209
controls and determines all activities and issues relating to a vessel.
Moreover, the present Court shows no inclination to restore strength
210
to the law of the flag principle. Spector presented an opportunity
for the Court to protect a foreign flag carrier, but a clear majority of
the Court refused to permit a foreign flag to serve as a shield against
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 308.
Id. at 310.
See supra Parts V.A-C.
See generally Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005).
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the application of American law.211 Schooner Exchange recognized
the basic concept of the law of the flag, but the subsequent cases have
narrowed and limited that general principle to the point where the
“mischievous fiction” of the law of the flag has been drained of
almost all force when used in attempts to avoid American
requirements.212 The attempt by the universalists to assert the law of a
foreign flag over bankruptcies in this country (or any other) runs
counter to the clear and long-established line of cases rejecting the
notion that a foreign flag controls all issues and disputes.
In order for universalism to work, the law must disregard local
concerns. After all, the fundamental premise of universalism is that
local concerns and local laws must yield to a universally applied law
(the law of the debtor’s home country). If one supports the
universalist position, then one must necessarily argue that the
Supreme Court has been wrong for over 150 years because the Court
has consistently and repeatedly rejected the argument that the law of
the flag trumps local concerns and local laws. The universalists may
argue that we live in a new era in which everything is different and
the old rules do not apply (history will determine whether that is true
or not). If it is the case that this is a new era, however, it seems
reasonable to require the universalists to demonstrate compelling
reasons why this long line of decisions should be neglected.
VI. MARITIME LAW’S
TREATMENT OF THE APPLICABLE LAW
The history of maritime law demonstrates that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly refused to apply a mechanical, one-dimensional
test based on the law of the flag to determine applicable law. In place
of such a test, Lauritzen v. Larsen presented a multi-factor analysis to
213
decide the issue. The seven factors were: (1) place of the wrongful
211. Id.
212. See generally Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
213. 345 U.S. 571, 583 (1953). Lauritzen involved a maritime tort (the facts of which are
discussed below). However, its multi-factor analysis is not limited to such torts. In Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., the Court decided that all claims arising under the
general maritime law should be subject to the Lauritzen analysis. 358 U.S. 354, 382 (1959). In
other words, Romero makes clear that even though Lauritzen arose out of the Jones Act, its
analysis applies to maritime law in general:
While Lauritzen v. Larsen involved claims asserted under the Jones Act, the principles
on which it was decided did not derive from the terms of that statute. We pointed out
that the Jones Act had been written “not on a clean slate, but as a postscript to a long
series of enactments governing shipping. All were enacted with regard to a seasoned
body of maritime law developed by the experience of American courts long
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act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4)
allegiance of the defendant ship owner; (5) place of contract; (6)
214
inaccessibility of the foreign forum; and (7) the law of the forum.
This analysis arose out of the following facts. Larsen was a
Danish seaman who was temporarily in New York, where he:
joined the crew of the Randa, a ship of Danish flag and registry,
owned by petitioner, a Danish citizen. Larsen signed ship’s articles,
written in Danish, providing that the rights of crew members would
be governed by Danish law and by the employer’s contract with the
Danish Seamen’s Union, of which Larsen was a member. He
was . . . injured aboard the Randa in the course of employment,
215
while it was in Havana harbor.

Larsen filed an action in federal court in New York under the Jones
216
The defendant
Act, and recovered damages for his injury.
appealed, arguing that Danish law controlled and that Larsen was not
entitled to his award under Danish law.217 The Second Circuit
218
affirmed the award of damages.
219
It highlighted the basic facts,
The Supreme Court reversed.
which pointed to Denmark as the country to provide the governing
law, stating:
This review of the connecting factors which either maritime law or
our municipal law of conflicts regards as significant in determining
the law applicable to a claim of actionable wrong shows an
overwhelming preponderance in favor of Danish law. The parties
are both Danish subjects, the events took place on a Danish ship,
not within our territorial waters. Against these considerations is
only the fact that the defendant was served here with process and
that the plaintiff signed on in New York, where the defendant was

accustomed to dealing with admiralty problems in reconciling our own with foreign
interests and in accommodating the reach of our own laws to those of other maritime
nations.” 345 U.S., at 577. Thus the Jones Act was applied “to foreign events, foreign
ships and foreign seamen only in accordance with the usual doctrine and practices of
maritime law.” 345 U.S., at 581. The broad principles of choice of law and the
applicable criteria of selection set forth in Lauritzen were intended to guide courts in
the application of maritime law generally. Of course, due regard must be had for the
differing interests advanced by varied aspects of maritime law. But the similarity in
purpose and function of the Jones Act and the general maritime principles of
compensation for personal injury, admit of no rational differentiation of treatment for
choice of law purposes. Thus the reasoning of Lauritzen v. Larsen governs all claims
here.
Romero, 358 U.S. at 382.
214. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-91.
215. Id. at 573.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 593.
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engaged in our foreign commerce. The latter event is offset by
220
provision of his contract that the law of Denmark should govern.

The Court later added to this analysis in Rhoditis, in which the
Court cautioned that the factors listed in Lauritzen were not meant to
221
The Court also
be applied mechanically and were not exclusive.
added a ship’s base of operations as another factor to be considered:222
“Accordingly, under the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy there are
at least eight factors to be considered in determining whether foreign
or domestic law will apply in an action within the admiralty
223
jurisdiction. The flag of the vessel involved is only one.” Thus, the
proper application of the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis factors depends
on a case-by-case analysis, and exclusive reliance on a vessel’s flag,
without any consideration of the other factors, is contrary to the
proper analysis the Court has established for maritime cases.224
220. Id. at 592.
221. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-09 (1970).
222. See id. at 309.
223. Gutoff Brief, supra note 127, at 21. The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis test is also
compatible with the approach of § 403 of the Restatement (Third), of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, which addresses the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign persons and
activities. Under § 403(2), factors to consider before exercising jurisdiction include:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated,
or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2)
(1987).
224. Gutoff Brief, supra note 127, at 21-22. At least one court has recognized the general
applicability of Lauritzen and Romero to international bankruptcy. See In re Maxwell
Commc’ns Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). In re Maxwell arose out of the collapse of a
media empire called Maxwell Communication, which spawned bankruptcy proceedings in the
United States and England. One issue in the case was which law and which court would govern
and decide an issue concerning the avoidance of certain pre-petition transfers. The court
ultimately decided to defer to the laws and courts of England. In doing so, the Second Circuit
cited several choice of law cases, including Lauritzen and Romero. Id. at 1047-48. This article
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A. A Suggested Application of a Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis Type
of Test to Chapter 15
If one accepts the view that the maritime analysis is analogous
enough to Chapter 15, questions naturally arise as to how and when
such an analysis could be applied to a Chapter 15 case. Does the
statutory framework of Chapter 15 even allow for the use of a
Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis type of test? If the answer is yes, under
what circumstances would such a test apply to a Chapter 15 case?
A natural opening for application of such a test is found in §
1506, the public policy exception.225 Section 1506 answers those who
assert that Congress spoke on the choice of law issue by enacting
Chapter 15. Some might argue that the choice of law issue has been
resolved because §§ 1501(a) and 1525(a), along with the mandatory
language of the other sections and the legislative history, express the
view of Congress that the law of a debtor’s center of main interests
shall control. This argument would go on to assert that the choice of
law is not a matter that has been left open for the courts. If this
argument is correct, then any comparisons to maritime law or any
other law would be pointless because the analysis of any choice of law
issue would be strictly confined to the statutory language.
However, choice of law is not a closed issue governed by
dispositive statutory language because § 1506 is a safety valve that
was deliberately inserted by Congress into Chapter 15 to prevent
mechanical applications of foreign law. Despite the repeated
expressions of support for global cooperation and harmony, Congress
was concerned about how the application of foreign law might affect
domestic parties and interests, and wanted to ensure that there would
be a mechanism to prevent unacceptable harm. Thus, § 1506 leaves
wide open the issue of the choice of law when public policy concerns
are at stake, and nothing in the statute prevents the courts from
looking to other relevant sources for guidance in deciding a choice of
law issue. A Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis type of test could provide a
useful guide by which to weigh a public policy challenge. This point
can be illustrated by the use of a hypothetical involving a Chinese oil
226
company with operations in the United States:
takes the court’s discussion a step further by placing the comparison in the context of the “law
of the flag” analysis.
225. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1506 (West Supp. 2006).
226. This hypothetical was presented in Chung, supra note 2, at 116, in order to demonstrate
the prejudicial effect of Chapter 15 on tort claimants. It was based on an actual failed attempt
by a Chinese oil company to acquire Unocal, an American oil company.
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Suppose a Chinese company owns a refinery and several producing
oil wells in the United States. Due to an incident at the refinery,
thousands of residents in the surrounding area are seriously injured.
Their claims threaten to overwhelm the company, and its lenders
and suppliers become nervous about doing business with it.
However, the producing oil wells generate sufficient revenue to
cover most of the claims. Under the historical, territorialist system,
the company would commence a bankruptcy action in the United
States, and a resolution would likely be reached where the claims
would be satisfied out of the present and future revenues of the
producing wells.
Under universalism and Chapter 15, on the other hand, the
company could file bankruptcy in China (which would be the
foreign main proceeding). An order granting recognition in the
U.S. would automatically stay the victims’ claims in the United
States. Furthermore, the tort victims would not be eligible to file
227
an involuntary petition in the United States . . . .

Under Chapter 15, it is possible that the tort victims would be forced
to go to China and “seek justice in a Chinese court applying Chinese
228
law.”
Most would probably agree that this would never happen in real
life because no American judge would allow that result and would
certainly invoke § 1506, the public policy exception. Yet what would
justify the invocation of § 1506, other than a visceral reaction? What
is the analytical framework that would lead to the conclusion that
forcing the tort victims into the Chinese legal system would violate
U.S. public policy? This would seem like an appropriate situation for
a Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis type of test.
Under such a test, the following factors would point to the
United States as the proper forum: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2)
allegiance or domicile of the injured; (3) inaccessibility of the foreign
229
forum; and (4) base of relevant commercial operations. The factors
227. Id. See also 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (West 2006). Under this statute, an involuntary case
may only be filed by a holder of a claim “that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a
bona fide dispute as to liability or amount.” Id. This language excludes the tort claimants in the
hypothetical.
228. Chung, supra note 2, at 116.
229. A separate or related factor could ask whether the foreign forum is governed by the
rule of law, affords adequate due process, and is free of corruption. Most would probably agree
that public policy would be violated if these considerations were absent in a foreign forum.
However, there are more difficult issues. Does the foreign forum provide procedural vehicles
that are available in the United States? For example, could the tort victims assert their claims as
part of a group or class, or would they be forced to bring individual proceedings? If they are
forced to bring individual claims, does this violate American public policy? What if the foreign
forum does not recognize theories of recovery or remedies available in the United States?
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pointing to China as the proper forum would include law of the flag
(home country) and allegiance of the defendant. It seems fair to
conclude that most observers would agree that the factors
overwhelmingly point to the United States as the proper forum.
For contractual relationships, the “place of contract” factor could
perhaps be refined to add additional factors such as the place where
the contract was made, the place where the contract was to be
performed, the extent to which the debtor or creditor made offers or
solicited acceptances in a country (for example, Norwegian Cruise
Line advertising in the United States), and the extent to which the
debtor or creditor sought or derived commercial benefits in the
foreign forum. Two hypotheticals illustrate how these factors might
operate.
Hypothetical 1: Suppose there is a Chinese manufacturer of
widgets. A large American bank seeks to gain entry into the
commercial lending market in China. It contacts the Chief Financial
Officer of the company and offers extremely attractive terms that are
designed to establish the bank’s presence in China. The company
accepts the terms of the loan, and a line of credit is established, with
the borrowed amounts secured by assets in China and the United
States. The bank sends senior officers and its outside lawyers to close
the loan in China.230 The Chinese company runs into financial
difficulties, and commences a bankruptcy case in China. The bank
exercises its rights and moves against the collateral in the United
States. The Chinese company responds by filing an application under
Chapter 15 in U.S. Bankruptcy Court for recognition of the foreign
main proceeding in China. The bank argues that it would violate
American public policy if it were forced to pursue its claim in a
Chinese court due to the inaccessibility of the forum, and the
primitive and unreliable state of the Chinese judicial system.
Hypothetical 2: The Chinese manufacturer seeks to expand into
the United States, and wants to open a distribution center in
California. It identifies a parcel of land and a warehouse in Long
Beach, and contacts a local bank to arrange mortgage financing to
purchase the property. The loan is negotiated and closed in

Hypothetically, what if creditors were not permitted to look beyond the corporate form in the
presence of insider abuse and seek recovery from insider assets? Would this violate public
policy?
230. This illustration is purely hypothetical in that this article does not purport to describe
or demonstrate knowledge of actual lending practices in China and the restrictions, if any, faced
by U.S. lenders in that market.
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California. The Chinese company runs into financial difficulties, and
commences a bankruptcy case in China. The bank exercises its rights
and commences foreclosure proceedings against the property. The
Chinese company responds by filing an application under Chapter 15
in U.S. Bankruptcy Court for recognition of the foreign main
proceeding in China. The bank argues that it would violate American
public policy if it were forced to pursue its claim in a Chinese court
due to the inaccessibility of the forum, and the primitive and
unreliable state of the Chinese judicial system.
The bank has a strong argument in Hypothetical 2 because the
public policy argument of the lender in Hypothetical 1 is much
weaker. There would probably be little sympathy if this lender were
forced to seek repayment in China. Again, the application of a multifactor test would assist the analysis for both hypotheticals. In either
event, it seems unfair to apply a one-dimensional test to both lenders
based on the manufacturer’s center of main interest. Any test that
would mechanically force both lenders into a Chinese court should be
231
questioned.
In sum, a Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis type of test provides a
framework to guide a public policy analysis. If the test points to the
231. It should be noted that the usefulness of the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis test may
depend on the presence of a genuine and well-founded public policy objection. To illustrate,
suppose Hypothetical 2 were redrawn as follows: A Canadian manufacturer based in Toronto
seeks to expand into the United States, and wants to open a distribution center in Buffalo, New
York (a distance of about one hundred miles). It identifies a parcel of land and a warehouse in
Buffalo, and contacts a local bank to arrange mortgage financing to purchase the property. The
loan is negotiated and closed in Buffalo. The Canadian company runs into financial difficulties,
and commences a bankruptcy case in Toronto. The bank exercises its rights and commences
foreclosure proceedings against the property. The Canadian company responds by filing an
application under Chapter 15 in U.S. Bankruptcy Court for recognition of the foreign main
proceeding in Canada. The bank argues that it would violate American public policy if it were
forced to enforce its rights in a Canadian court. Under these facts, it is unlikely that a public
policy objection would carry much weight. Thus, despite the overwhelming connection to
Buffalo, it is highly likely that an American court would require the New York lender to pursue
its claims in Toronto. A reader might, at this point, argue that the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis
test serves no purpose because all that matters is the initial determination as to whether public
policy is violated (to be sure, this article does not address or attempt to define the issue
regarding the nature and scope of the public policy exception). However, questions of public
policy are rarely so black and white as to present an easy case, and the Lauritzen-RomeroRhoditis test can assist and inform the analysis. Referring back to Hypothetical 1, for example,
even though the lender might have a strong argument regarding the unfairness of and absence
of due process in the Chinese courts, the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis test could be used by the
Chinese debtor to point to the matter being heard in China and governed by Chinese law. This
demonstrates the flexibility of the test, as opposed to the rigid “law of the flag” test. Its value
lies in the fact that it takes the factual context into account in pointing to the appropriate forum
and law. It works without a pre-determined agenda to always favor the foreign forum.

01__CHUNG.DOC

2007]

10/4/2007 9:50:53 AM

THE RETROGRESSIVE FLAW OF CHAPTER 15 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

301

United States as the proper forum, it would lend weight to, and
perhaps even be dispositive of, a public policy challenge objecting to
the application of foreign law. If the test points to another country as
the proper forum, that would suggest that American public policy
might not be violated if the Chapter 15 case were administered
elsewhere. A crucial point is that it retains flexibility and permits a
court to take into account the needs and circumstances of each case,
as opposed to a clumsy, mechanical attempt to force every case into
the same mold.232

232. The ever-present problem with a system like universalism is that it must necessarily
ignore the unique aspects of each case. However, facts do not present themselves in a
predictable, cookie-cutter fashion. In a case from England, the court was asked to defer to a
bankruptcy case in the United States. Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. v. United States Lines,
Inc., [1989] Q.B. 360, 363. However, the English court took note of the particular facts of the
local situation to maintain English control over the English portion of the case. Id. at 389. This
is how courts act in the absence of universalist restrictions. Felixstowe arose out of the
American bankruptcy of United States Lines, Inc. (USL). Id. at 365. Prior to its bankruptcy,
USL was engaged in a worldwide shipping business. Id. It was incorporated in Delaware, had
its headquarters in New Jersey, and operated in England with an address in Knightsbridge and a
local office in Felixstowe. Id. Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. (FDR) was “a statutory body
responsible for the operations of the dock and railway at Felixstowe.” Id. at 366. USL owed
FDR more than £367,000 arising out of USL’s use of berthing and dock facilities and for unpaid
stevedoring and wharfage services. Id. Freightliners Ltd. (FL) was a London-based container
company that was owed more than £236,000 by USL for unpaid provisions, maintenance and
inspection of containers. Id. Europe Container Terminus (B.V.) (ECT) was a Dutch company,
id. at 363, that was owed more than £1.69 million by USL for unpaid stevedoring facilities. Id. at
366. FDR, FL, and ECT applied for and were granted Mareva injunctions by a British court.
Id. at 363. These injunctions restrained USL from removing its English assets from the United
Kingdom, so that such assets would be preserved for the unpaid creditors. Id. USL made its
own application in the British court to set aside the injunctions. Id. It argued that, on the
grounds of international comity, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court should have exclusive jurisdiction
over USL’s assets. Id. It also argued that the injunctions interfered with the administration of
the Chapter 11 case by, among other things, giving a preference to the unsecured creditors in
the United Kingdom over the unsecured creditors elsewhere. Id. The court denied USL’s
application and kept the injunctions in force. Id. at 389. In denying the application, the court
noted an important fact: the result of USL’s proposed reorganization would be to limit its
operations to North America and discontinue its operations in the rest of the world:
No doubt this will be of great benefit both to U.S.L. themselves, and also to their
North American creditors, who may well both be able to recover their debts or at least
a substantial dividend thereon, and also, if the scheme succeeds continue their
commercial relationship with U.S.L. as hitherto. . . .
But the position of the plaintiffs is entirely different. They are English creditors whose
business is based here and does not extend at all to North America; it follows that, in
view of the intended withdrawal of U.S.L. from Europe, there could be no possible
benefit to them in seeing the Mareva funds repatriated to the United States, and
ploughed into U.S.L.’s general funds being used in the above manner in the effort to
keep U.S.L. afloat as a going concern.
Id. at 386. The court further observed:
Moreover, whereas the retention of the Mareva funds here will give the plaintiffs and
their fellow European creditors security for a worthwhile percentage of their debts,
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CONCLUSION
The appeal of universalism lies in its simplicity and predictability.
The law of the home country is an easy test to apply, and cuts through
all the thorny issues raised by competing laws and policies. To its
supporters, its simplicity provides an elegant solution to transnational
bankruptcies. To be sure, simplicity can be a sign of elegance. On
the other hand, simplicity can be the result of naïveté—in this
instance, the notion that conflicts generated by international
commerce can be resolved by a one-dimensional test agreed upon by
a group of the international, technocratic elite. The line of maritime
cases and the efforts of the UNCITRAL working group both address
a common problem—what legal test should be applied to determine
the applicable law in a world where businesses operate globally? The
maritime decisions are the result of cases and controversies arising
between adversarial parties acting in furtherance of their own
commercial interests, decided by judges with a duty to uphold the
law. The Model Law and Chapter 15 were generated by highly
skilled technocrats, representing no particular commercial interest,
engaged in discussions removed from the distractions of day-to-day
business concerns and challenges.233 The judicial process and the

this same fund, if transferred to the United States, will be a mere drop in the ocean of
the total assets, and therefore no more than the slimmest marginal benefit to U.S.L.
and the United States creditors.
Id. at 387. This case demonstrates the nature and circumstances of the principled justifications
for protection of local creditors. The court did not simply resort to atavistic nationalism to
protect the local creditors. There were principled reasons based on the facts to support the
decision. Id. at 389. Just as this case presented a compelling and unique set of facts to support
the protection of local creditors, the next transnational insolvency proceeding will present its
own set. Yet, the supporters of universalism wish to sweep all such reasons aside.
233. The peculiar nature of international organizations and agendas driven by the
technocratic elite has drawn the attention of other commentators:
Much distinguishes these organizations, which have their own histories, cultures and
agendas, but what is of particular interest are the common elements of their lawmaking
process. At their heart is an interplay between an ad hoc task force consisting of
academics and practitioners with great substantive command of the subject under
consideration, and a broader body of lawyers, typically well-seasoned and
distinguished, whose approval is necessary before the group will embrace a task force
proposal as its own. Membership in the task force tends to be stable but not
overlapping, while the broader group has a less stable membership but a broader range
of lawmaking authority. The members of both bodies, the task forces and the broader
group, bring their own preferences and interests but do not belong to parties or
coalitions that can impose discipline and develop collective programs. Even in those
organizations where the members in the larger body have some sort of official status as
representatives of their nations, such as UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT and the Hague
Conference, rarely do national governments impose substantial political constraints on
their emissary. Rather, the technical nature of the subject matter ensures the relative
obscurity of the process.
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technocrats have generated two completely different solutions to the
common problem. Which is better?
It is easy to see the justifications that the members of the
Working Group would advance in defense of their efforts. The fact
that they did not represent any particular commercial interest should
actually be viewed as a benefit, they would argue, because the process
234
was free of financial self-dealing. By being independent, they were
able to focus on the needs of all parties and the entire process and
framework, and were not pushing selfish interests without regard to
the effect on the whole.
Despite these justifications, it seems fair to question the merits
and results of a process that operates in a vacuum, where the goal is
to create and preserve a pristine forum unsullied by the grit and grime
235
of commerce. The process by which the Model Law was developed

What these bodies seem to represent, in other words, is a fairly complete realization of
the technocratic ideal of lawmaking. Each nation’s leading specialists convene to draft
an instrument that ought to embody the best rules that they can devise for
international commerce. National politicians participate only indirectly, mostly by
retaining the final say over accepting the completed instrument. The technical experts
have a relatively free hand to discover the common ground that can transcend
differences in culture, history, levels of economic development, and social structure.
Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial
Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 755-56 (1999). Moreover, the members of the Working Group “do
not formally represent organized interests, although they may have some affinity or professional
ties with particular groups.” Id. at 758.
234. However, there is a contrary view to this assertion:
The official commentary notes that bankruptcy practitioners, both in the private bar
and the judiciary, had an important role in developing the [Model] Law, during the
drafting process and through an international meeting held to review the Working
Group’s draft. The expansion of discretionary authority of bankruptcy tribunals
doubtlessly appealed to this group. Judges would have more power, thereby
enhancing the prestige and satisfaction of their work. Lawyers who specialized in the
field could charge more for their skills as a result of the more challenging
legal environment.
Id. at 786-87.
235. Plus, a one-factor, bright line test invites manipulation and gamesmanship. Professor
LoPucki has written extensively on the incentives to engage in manipulation of the home
country standard, and the ease with which the home country can be shifted by a debtor acting in
anticipation of bankruptcy. See, e.g., LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra
note 56; LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 31; LoPucki, Global and
Out of Control, supra note 25; LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 27. Just like the
vessel owner shopping for a more relaxed regulatory standard in order to escape the burdens of
its home country, a strategic debtor can alter the “center of its main interests” to select the
desired bankruptcy law. Indeed, it is out of this discussion regarding forum shopping that the
comparison between multinational debtors and vessels flying a flag of convenience was drawn.
The attractions and drawbacks of a bright line test arise out of a fundamental tension in any
legal system:
In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between two social needs: the need
for certain rules which can, over great areas of conduct, safely be applied by private
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stands in stark contrast to the Supreme Court’s maritime cases, which
were decided under the “case or controversy” requirement of the
236
Through a system where actual conflicts and
Constitution.
competing interests are heard and resolved, a distinct line of
reasoning and analysis over a span of centuries has repeatedly
rejected the simplicity of the law of the flag as the controlling test.
The multi-dimensional analysis of the Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis
trilogy may be messy, difficult to apply, and lacking in ex ante
predictability. Nevertheless, this test, and rulings such as Spector and
Cunard, represent the accumulated experience of the Supreme Court,
and international bankruptcy theory may find guidance from that
experience.

individuals to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up of social
issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official choice,
issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete
case. In some legal systems at some periods it may be that too much is sacrificed to
certainty, and that judicial interpretation of statutes or of precedent is too formal and
so fails to respond to the similarities and differences between cases which are visible
only when they are considered in the light of social aims. In other systems or at other
periods it may seem that too much is treated by courts as perennially open or revisable
in precedents, and too little respect paid to such limits as legislative language, despite
its open texture, does after all provide.
HART, supra note 28, at 130.
236. The “case or controversy” requirement is one of the bedrock principles underlying
litigation in the federal courts:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between
two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2. The reason for the “case or controversy requirement” is clear and well
settled:
[I]t is quite clear that “the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of
justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.” Thus, the
implicit policies embodied in Article III, and not history alone, impose the rule against
advisory opinions on federal courts. . . . [T]he rule against advisory opinions also
recognizes that such suits often “are not pressed before the Court with that clear
concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for
decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted
situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests.”
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968) (citation omitted).

